Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 92a

No regard need be paid to a rumour that originated after marriage!¹  — It might have been assumed that since she was to appear before the Beth din to obtain the authorization²  [for her marriage].³  the rumour is regarded as one [that arose] before marriage⁴  and she should in consequence he forbidden,⁵  we were, therefore, taught [that even in such circumstances a rumour is disregarded].

IF SHE MARRIED WITH THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE BETH DIN SHE MUST LEAVE etc. Ze'iri said: Our Mishnah cannot be authentic⁶  owing to a Baraitha that was recited at the academy. For it was recited at the academy: If the Beth din ruled⁷  that the sun had set,⁸  and later it appeared, [such a decision] is no ruling⁹  but a mere error.¹⁰

R. Nahman. however, stated: [Such an authorization]¹¹  is [to be regarded as] a ruling.¹²  Said R. Nahman: You can have proof¹³  that it [is to be regarded as] a ruling. For throughout the Torah a single witness is never believed while in this case he is believed. But why? Obviously¹⁴  because [such an authorization is regarded as] a ruling.¹⁵  Raba said: You can have proof¹³  that it¹¹  is [to be regarded as a mere] error.¹⁶  For were Beth din to issue a ruling in a case of some forbidden fat or blood that it is permitted, and then find a [strong] reason for forbidding it, [their subsequent ruling], should they retract and rule again that it is permitted,¹⁷  would be completely disregarded;¹⁸  whereas here,¹⁹  it should one witness present himself,²⁰  the woman would be permitted to marry again,²¹  and should two witnesses [afterwards] appear²²  the woman would be forbidden to marry again,²³  but should another witness subsequently appear²⁴  the woman would again be permitted to marry. But why?²⁵  Obviously²⁶  because it¹⁹  [is regarded as a mere] error.²⁷

R. Eliezer also is of the opinion that it¹⁹  is [to be regarded as a mere] error. For it was taught: R. Eliezer said: Let the law pierce through the mountain²⁸  and let her²⁹  bring a fat sin-offering.³⁰  Now, if it be granted that it¹⁹  is [to be treated as] an error one can well see the reason why she is to bring an offering.³¹  If, however, it be contended that it¹⁹  is [to be regarded as] a ruling, why should she bring an offering!³²  But is it not possible that R. Eliezer holds the opinion that an individual who committed a sin in reliance on a ruling of the Beth din is liable?³³  — If so, what [could have been meant by] 'Let the law pierce through the mountain'!³⁴

IF THE BETH DIN DECIDED THAT SHE MAY MARRY AGAIN etc. What is meant by DISGRACED HERSELF? — R. Eliezer³⁵  replied: She played the harlot. R. Johanan replied: [If being] a widow [she was married] to a High Priest, [or if] a divorcee or a haluzah [she was married] to a common priest. He who stated,'She played the harlot'³⁶  would, even more so, [subject the woman to a sin-offering. if as] a widow [she was married] to a High Priest.³⁷  He, however, who stated, '[If being] a widow [she was married] to a High Priest' does not³⁸  [subject her to a sin-offering if] she played the harlot. What is the reason? — Because she might plead, 'It is you who granted me the status of an unmarried woman'.³⁹

It was taught in agreement with the opinion of R. Johanan: If Beth din directed that she may be married again. and she went and disgraced herself, so that, for instance, [being] a widow [she was married] to a High Priest.[or being] a divorcee or a haluzah [she was married] to a common priest. she is liable to bring an offering for every single act of cohabitation;⁴⁰  so R. Eleazar. But the Sages said: One offering for all. The Sages, however, agree with R. Eleazar that, If she was married to five men, she is liable to bring an offering for every one, since [here it is a case of] separate bodies.

MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND AND SON WENT TO COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA WAS TOLD,⁴¹  'YOUR HUSBAND DIED AND YOUR SON DIED AFTERWARDS',⁴²  AND SHE MARRIED AGAIN,⁴³  AND LATER SHE WAS TOLD,' IT WAS OTHERWISE'.⁴⁴  SHE MUST DEPART;⁴⁵  AND ANY CHILD BORN BEFORE OR AFTER⁴⁶  IS A BASTARD.⁴⁷  IF SHE WAS TOLD. 'YOUR SON DIED AND YOUR HUSBAND DIED AFTERWARDS',⁴⁸  AND SHE CONTRACTED THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE, AND AFTERWARDS SHE WAS TOLD, 'IT WAS OTHERWISE'⁴⁹  SHE MUST DEPART;⁵⁰  AND ANY CHILD BORN BEFORE OR AFTER⁴⁶  IS A BASTARD.⁴⁷

IF SHE WAS TOLD, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD, AND SHE MARRIED, AND AFTERWARDS SHE WAS TOLD, 'HE WAS ALIVE⁵¹  BUT IS NOW DEAD', SHE MUST DEPART,⁵²  AND ANY CHILD BORN BEFORE [THE DEATH OF HER FIRST HUSBAND]⁵³  IS A BASTARD, BUT ONE BORN AFTER IT⁵⁴  IS NO BASTARD. IF SHE WAS TOLD, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD AND SHE WAS BETROTHED, AND AFTERWARDS HER HUSBAND APPEARED, SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM. ALTHOUGH THE OTHER⁵⁵  GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE HE HAS NOT THEREBY DISQUALIFIED HER FROM MARRYING A PRIEST. THIS R. ELEAZAR B. MATHIA DERIVED BY MEANS OF THE FOLLOWING EXPOSITION: NEITHER [SHALL THEY⁵⁶  TAKE] A WOMAN PUT AWAY FROM HER HUSBAND,⁵⁷  EXCLUDES ONE PUT AWAY⁵⁸  FROM A MAN WHO IS NOT HER HUSBAND.⁵⁹

GEMARA. What is meant by BEFORE⁶⁰  and what is meant by AFTER?⁶¹  If it be suggested that BEFORE means before the [second] report and that AFTER means after that report, it should have been stated: The child is a bastard!⁶²  Because it was desired to state in the final clause, IF SHE WAS TOLD, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD', AND SHE MARRIED, AND AFTERWARDS SHE WAS TOLD, 'HE WAS ALIVE BUT IS NOW DEAD … ANY CHILD BORN BEFORE⁶³  [THE DEATH OF HER FIRST HUSBAND] IS A BASTARD, BUT ONE BORN AFTER IT⁶⁴  IS NO BASTARD, the expressions BORN BEFORE OR AFTER IS A BASTARD were used in the first clause also.

Our Rabbis taught: This⁶⁵  is the view of R. Akiba who stated: Betrothal with those who are subject [on intercourse] to the penalties of a negative commandment is invalid.⁶⁶  The Sages, however, said that [the child] of a sister-in-law⁶⁷  is no bastard.⁶⁸  Let it be said: The child of a union between those who are subject [on intercourse] to the penalties of a negative precept is no bastard!⁶⁹  — This Tanna⁷⁰  is the following Tanna of the school of R. Akiba, who stated that [only a child] of a union that is subject to the penalties of a negative precept owing to consanguinity is a bastard, but one born from a union that is subject to the penalties of a mere negative precept⁷¹  is no bastard.

Rab Judah stated

1. If, for instance, after a priest had married, a rumour arose that before her marriage with him his wife was a divorcee or a harlot. Git. 81a, 88b, 89a.
2. Lit., 'and we permitted'.
3. Before it had taken place.
4. Her appearance before the court implying that, already at that time, the possibility that her husband was still alive was being considered.
5. To her second husband, as if the rumour had been current before her marriage.
6. Lit., 'our Mishnah is not'.
7. On a cloudy day which happened to be the Sabbath day.
8. And permitted the people to commence their week-day labours which are forbidden on the Sabbath.
9. Which exempts the individual who acted upon it from a sin- offering and affects the nature of the sin-offering which the congregation who acted upon it has to bring.
10. Since the erroneous ruling of the Beth din was not due to an oversight on their part of a point of law but to a false assumption of a matter of fact. They assumed that the sun had set, while in fact, it had not. Similarly here, They assumed that the woman's husband was dead when as a matter of fact he was alive. Our Mishnah, therefore, which exempts the woman from a sin-offering cannot be authentic.
11. The permission to the woman to marry again, spoken of in our Mishnah.
12. Subject to the same laws as all erroneous rulings issued by a Beth din. Cf. supra 11. 6. and Hor. 2aff.
13. Lit., 'thou shalt know'.
14. Lit., 'not?'
15. The woman did not act on the evidence of the witness which, as is now apparent, was due to an error, but on the ruling of the Beth din who accepted the evidence of this witness. Whatever their reason may have been it was their ruling that was the cause of the woman's marriage.
16. [They assumed that every woman makes careful investigations before she marries (v. supra 25a) and it has been found that this was not the case].
17. [Rashi: For a reason not as strong as that which prompted them to prohibit It. Me'iri: For the very same reason which made them permit it at the very first].
18. Lit., 'we do not look to them'. Once it has been found that their first ruling was erroneous it cannot again be adopted.
19. v. supra p. 625, n. 8.
20. Testifying that the woman's husband was dead.
21. Lit., 'we permit'.
22. Declaring that the husband was still alive.
23. Lit., 'we forbid'.
24. Stating that the husband has died since.
25. If the first authorization is to be regarded as a ruling it should not again be adopted (cf. supra n. 2), once it has been proved (by the testimony of the two witnesses) that it was erroneous.
26. Lit., 'not'?
27. It is assumed that though the first witness misled the court the last is speaking the truth.
28. l.e., one should delve deeper into the subject (cf. Rashi a.l.) 'Justice under all circumstances' (Jast.).
29. The woman who married by permission of the court on the evidence of one witness.
30. Cf. Sanh. 6b. Though, if viewed superficially, it would appear that the woman, since she had acted on the decision of a court, is not liable to a sin-offering (cf. Hor. 2a). careful consideration of the case would reveal that she is liable, since the decision was based on the error of the witness and not on a legal oversight of the court. Cf. supra p. 625, n. 7.
31. Cf. supra note 14, second section.
32. Cf. loc. cit. first section.
33. To a sin-offering.
34. Cf. supra note 12 (first interpretation) and supra note 14.
35. Marg. note, 'Eleazar'.
36. That even in such a case a sin-offering must be brought.
37. Since it is obvious that the court's permission did not extend to a marriage which is in any case forbidden to the woman, even if her husband is dead.
38. Lit., 'but not'.
39. And since she acted on a ruling of a court, she is not liable to a sin-offering.
40. This is further explained in Ker. 15a.
41. Lit., 'and they came and said to her'.
42. As the son was alive when his father died the widow is not subject to the levirate marriage or halizah.
43. A stranger.
44. Lit., 'the matter was reversed', the son died first, so that when his father died afterwards the widow was subject to halizah or levirate marriage.
45. From her second husband, since he married her before she had performed the required halizah.
46. The second report. Lit., 'and the first and last child'.
47. Being the issue of a union forbidden by a negative precept. V. Gemara infra.
48. V. p. 627. n. 10.
49. V. supra p. 627, n. 8.
50. From the levir, to whom, (her husband having had issue from her at the time he died) she is forbidden as 'his brother's wife'.
51. At the time she married her second husband.
52. From her second husband who married her while, as a married woman, she was forbidden to him.
53. Lit., 'and the first child'.
54. Lit., 'and the last'.
55. Lit., 'the last, the man who betrothed her.
56. Priests.
57. Lev. XXI, 7-
58. Lit., 'and not'.
59. The divorce being unnecessary it has no effect on the status of the woman.
60. In the first clauses of our Mishnah.
61. Lit., 'what is first and what is last'.
62. Since the child's legitimacy is not determined by the date of the report but by the facts.
63. Lit., 'the first'.
64. Lit., 'and the last'.
65. The statement in the first clause of our Mishnah that the child is a bastard.
66. V. supra 10b. And no divorce is consequently required.
67. Who married a stranger before she had performed halizah with the levir.
68. Tosef. XI. Since such marriage is forbidden by a negative precept only, and is not subject to kareth.
69. This more general statement would have also included the particular case of the sister-inlaw mentioned.
70. Referred to in the Baraitha cited as 'the Sages'.
71. The marriage, for instance, of the sister-in-law to a stranger. The general statement (v. supra note 7) was consequently inadmissible.

in the name of Rab: Whence is it deduced that betrothal with a sister-in-law¹  is of no validity?²  — From the Scriptural text,³  The wife of the dead shall not be married⁴  outside unto one who is not of his kin,⁵  there shall be no validity in the betrothal⁶  of her by a stranger.⁷  Samuel, however, stated: Owing to our [intellectual] poverty⁸  it is necessary [that she be given] a letter of divorce; Samuel having been in doubt as to whether the expression,⁹  The wife of the dead shall not be,¹⁰  served the purpose of¹¹  a negative precept¹²  or rather indicated¹¹  that betrothal with such a woman is invalid.

R. Mari b. Rachel said to R. Ashi: Thus said Amemar, 'The law is in agreement with Samuel'. Said R. Ashi: Now that Amemar has said that the law is in agreement with Samuel, her levir,¹³  if he was a priest,¹⁴  submits to her halizah and she is permitted to her second husband.¹⁵  He¹⁶  surely benefits¹⁷  thereby.¹⁸  and thus the sinner¹⁹  is at an advantage!²⁰  — Rather [this is the reading]: If her levir²¹  was an Israelite, the other²²  gives her a letter of divorce and she is permitted to the levir.²³

R. Giddal stated in the name of R. Hiyya b. Joseph in the name of Rab: While betrothal with a sister-in-law²⁴  is invalid, marriage with her is valid.²⁵  If betrothal, however, is invalid, marriage also should be invalid! — Read: Both betrothal and marriage with her are invalid. And if you prefer I might say. What is meant by 'marriage with her is valid'? — It constitutes an act of²⁶  harlotry²⁷  in accordance with the ruling of R. Hamnuna.For R. Hamnuna stated: A woman who, while awaiting the decision of the levir, played the harlot, is forbidden to marry the levir. And if you prefer I might say: [The reading is]. in fact, as has been originally stated, that betrothal with her is invalid but marriage with her is valid,²⁸  since her case might be mistaken for that of a woman whose husband went to a country beyond the sea.²⁹

R. Jannai said: A vote was taken at the college and it was decided that betrothal with a sister-in-law³⁰  has no validity. Said R. Johanan to him: O Master, is not this [law contained in] a³¹  Mishnah? For we have learnt: If a man said to a woman, 'Be thou³²  betrothed unto me after I shall have become a proselyte'. 'after thou shalt have been a proselyte'. 'after I shall have been emancipated'. 'after thou shalt have been emancipated'. 'after thy husband shall have died', 'after thy sister shall have died' or 'after thy brother-in-law shall have submitted to thy halizah', the betrothal is invalid!³³  — The other replied: Had I not lifted up the sherd, would you have found the pearl beneath it?³⁴

Resh Lakish said to him:³⁵  Had not a great man praised you. I would have told you that the Mishnah [you cited represents the view] of R. Akiba who maintains that betrothal with those who are subject to the penalties of a negative precept is invalid.³⁶

If [this Mishnah, however, represents the view of] R. Akiba, betrothal [with the sister-in-law]³⁷  should be valid where [the stranger] said to her, 'after thy brother-in-law shall have submitted to thy halizah', since R. Akiba has been heard to state that one may transfer possession of that which is not yet in existence;³⁸  for we learned:

1. V. supra note 5.
2. And no divorce is consequently required.
3. Lit., 'because it is said'.
4. Lit., 'she shall not be', [H].
5. Deut. XXV, 5.
6. Lit., 'being'. [H], i.e., 'betrothal'.
7. Lit., 'a stranger shall have no being in her'. [H] (supra n. 15) is of the same rt. vhv, as that of vhv, (supra. 13).
8. Inability to understand the meaning of the Scriptural text mentioned.
9. Lit., 'that'.
10. Deut. xxv, 5.
11. Lit., 'that it came'.
12. And, as is the case with other unions that are forbidden by negative precepts, the betrothal is valid.
13. The brother-in-law of the widow, spoken of in the first case of our Mishnah, who married a stranger and from whom, according to Samuel, she requires a divorce.
14. To whom the sister-in-jaw would thus be forbidden even after she had been divorced by the stranger. A priest is forbidden to marry a divorced woman. V. Lev. XXI, 7.
15. Lit., 'to him', the stranger whom she married.
16. The second husband. v. supra n. 7.
17. He is permitted to continue to live with his wife.
18. By the halizah of the levir.
19. Who contracted a union before instituting the necessary enquiries as to the circumstances of his wife's first husband's death.
20. Lit., 'gains'.
21. Cf. supra note 5.
22. The second husband. Cf. supra note 7.
23. Lit., 'to him'.
24. Who, before she performed halizah with the levir had married a stranger.
25. This validity, it is at present assumed, subjects the woman to the necessity of a letter of divorce.
26. Lit., 'In'.
27. By such a marriage she becomes forbidden to marry the levir as if she had played the harlot; but no letter of divorce is required.
28. In the sense that she requires a letter of divorce. Cf. p. 630, n. 17. and the following note.
29. And she married in accordance with the decision of a court on the evidence of one witness who testified that her first husband was dead. As the woman in this case requires a letter of divorce, it was ordained, as a preventive measure, that in the case spoken of in our Mishnah also a letter of divorce shall be required. the validity spoken of extending, however, to this requirement and no further. In the case of betrothal no preventive measure was enacted since in this case also no letter of divorce is required.
30. V. p. 630, n. 16.
31. Lit., 'our'.
32. Lit., 'behold thou art'. Cf. P.B. p. 298.
33. Kid. 62a, Keth. 58b. B.M. 16b. Betrothal cannot take effect at once owing to his stipulation and it cannot take place in the future because that which is not yet in existence may not be acquired. From this it follows that before the levir has submitted to halizah betrothal by a stranger is invalid, which is in effect the law reported by R. Jannai.
34. I.e., had not R. Jannai stated his ruling it might never have occurred to R. Johanan that the reason for the invalidity of the betrothal in the case of the sister-in- law was the law that betrothal with a sister-in-law by a stranger is never valid before the levir has submitted to halizah. He might have assumed the invalidity in this particular case also to be due to the fact that the man distinctly desired it to take place in the future, and no one can acquire that which is not yet in existence.
35. R. Johanan.
36. Marriage of a sister-in-law by a stranger before she has performed halizah with the levir is forbidden by such a negative precept. This Mishnah, therefore, provides no proof, like the statement of R. Jannai, that the Rabbis also admit invalidity in such a case.
37. Lit., 'with', or 'in her'.
38. Consequently. the betrothal here, though it was dependent on a future event which had not yet taken place. should also be valid.