Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 87a

THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH.¹  IF HE DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY] MARRIED TO A LEVITE SHE MAY EAT TITHE. IF THE LATTER DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY EAT TITHE. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY] MARRIED TO A PRIEST SHE MAY EAT TERUMAH. IF THE LATTER DIED AND SHE HAD A SON BY HIM SHE MAY EAT TERUMAH. IF HER SON BY THE PRIEST DIED SHE MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH. IF HER SON BY THE LEVITE DIED SHE MAY NOT EAT TITHE. IF HER SON BY THE ISRAELITE DIED SHE RETURNS TO THE HOUSE OF HER FATHER; AND IT IS CONCERNING SUCH A WOMAN THAT IT WAS SAID, AND IS RETURNED UNTO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, AS IN HER YOUTH, SHE MAY EAT OF HER FATHER'S BREAD.²

GEMARA. IF HER SON BY THE LEVITE DIED SHE MAY AGAIN EAT TERUMAH, because she is again entitled to eat it by virtue of her son;³  whence is this⁴  derived? — R. Abba replied in the name of Rab: [From the use of the expression,] But a daughter⁵  [instead of] 'a daughter'.⁶  In accordance with whose view?⁷  Is it in accordance with that of R. Akiba who bases expositions on Wawin!⁸  — It may be said [to be in agreement] even [with the view of the] Rabbis, since the entire expression But a daughter⁵  is superfluous.⁹

Our Rabbis taught: When she¹⁰  returns,¹¹  she returns only to [the privilege of eating] terumah, but does not return to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulder.¹²  Said R. Hisda in the name of Rabina b. Shila, 'What Scriptural text proves this?¹³  — She shall not eat of the terumah of the holy things,¹⁴  she must not eat of that which is set apart¹⁵  from the holy things'.¹⁶  R. Nahman replied¹⁷  in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: Of [her father's] bread,⁵  but not all [her father's] bread;¹⁸  this excludes the breast and the shoulder.¹²  Rami b. Hama demurred: Might it not be suggested that this¹⁹  excludes the invalidation of vows!²⁰  Raba replied: A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael has long ago settled this difficulty. For a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: What need was there for Scripture to state, But the vow of a widow, or of her that is divorced … shall stand against her?²¹  Is she not free from the authority of her father and also from that of her husband!²²  The fact is that where the father had entrusted [his daughter] to the representatives of the husband, or where the representatives of the father had entrusted her to the representatives of the husband, and on the way²³  she became a widow or was divorced, [it would not have been known] whether she was to be described as of²⁴  the house of her father²⁵  or as of the house of her husband;²⁶  hence the need for the text²⁷  to tell you that as soon as she had left her father's authority, even if only for a short while, he may no more invalidate her vows.²⁸

R. Safra replied:²⁹  She may eat of her father's bread,³⁰  only bread but no flesh.³¹  R. Papa replied:²⁹  She may eat of her father's bread,³⁰  only the bread which is the property of her father;³²  excluding however, the breast and the shoulder which [priests] obtain from the table of the Most High.³³

Raba, however, replied:²⁹  And the breast of the waving and the thigh of heaving shall ye eat … thou, and thy daughters with thee,³⁴  only when they are with thee.³⁵

R. Adda b. Ahabah stated that a Tanna taught: When she³⁶  returns to her father's house, she returns [only to the privilege of eating] terumah, but does not return to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulders. [If she³⁷  returns, however,] by virtue of her son,³⁸  she returns also to [the privilege of eating] the breast and the shoulder.³⁹  R. Mordecai went and recited this traditional statement in the presence of R. Ashi, when the latter said to him, 'Whence [has this case]⁴⁰  been included?⁴¹  From "But a daughter".⁴²  Should she, then, be more important than the other!'⁴³  — There,⁴³  the excluding texts were written;⁴⁴  but here⁴⁰  no excluding texts were written.

THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE etc. Our Rabbis taught: And is returned unto her father's house,⁴²  excludes one who is awaiting the decision of the levir;⁴⁵  as in her youth,⁴²  excludes a pregnant woman.⁴⁶  But could not this [law,⁴⁷  however, be arrived at by] logical argument: If where a child by a first husband is not regarded as the child by the second husband, in respect of exempting the woman from the levirate marriage,⁴⁸  the embryo is nevertheless regarded as a born child,⁴⁹  how much more should the embryo be regarded as a born child where a child by the first husband is regarded as the child of the second, in respect of depriving a woman of her right to terumah!⁵⁰  No; this is no argument.⁵¹  If an embryo was regarded as a born child in respect of the levirate marriage, where the dead were given the same status as the living,⁵²  should an embryo be regarded as a born child in respect of terumah, where the dead were not given the same status as the living?⁵³  Consequently Scripture expressly stated, As in her youth,⁵⁴  to exclude a pregnant woman.

And it was necessary for Scripture to write, As⁵⁵  in her youth, to exclude the pregnant woman; and also⁵⁶  And have no child,⁵⁴  to⁵⁷  exclude one who has a born child. For had the All Merciful written only And have no child,⁵⁴  it might have been assumed [that only a woman who has a born child is forbidden to eat terumah, because] at first⁵⁸  there was one body and now there are two bodies,⁵⁹  but that a pregnant woman, who formed at first⁵⁸  one body and is now also one body on]y, may eat, [hence the second text⁶⁰  was] required. And had the All Merciful written of the pregnant woman only it might have been assumed [that only she is forbidden to eat terumah] because at first⁵⁸  her body

1. She loses through her marriage the right she enjoyed as the daughter of a priest while she was still unmarried.
2. Lev. XXII, 13.
3. By the priest.
4. That her son by the priest enables her again to eat terumah even though she was deprived of that right during the period she lived with the Levite and the Israelite.
5. Lev. XXII, 13.
6. From the superfluous Waw in [H].
7. Is this deduction made.
8. And not in accordance with the view of the Rabbis (cf. Sanh. 51b) who are in the majority and differ from R. Akiba. V. supra 68b.
9. The previous verse (Lev. XXII, 12) also speaking of the priest's daughter it would have been quite sufficient for v. 13 to begin with the personal pronoun, 'But if she be'.
10. The priest's daughter who was a widow or divorced and have no child. (V. Lev. XXII, 13).
11. Unto her father's house (v. ibid.).
12. Which are also among the priestly gifts. Cf. Ex. XXIX, 27, Lev. VII, 34 X, 14.
13. That the breast and shoulder remain forbidden to her even after she returns to her father's house.
14. Lev. XXII, 12, where instead of [H] only [H] could have been written.
15. [H] from the same rt. as [H] (v. supra n. 12).
16. The sacrifices; reference to the breast and shoulder. (V. supra n. 10). These are forbidden to her even after she returns to her father's house. (V. supra 68b).
17. To the enquiry of R. Hisda.
18. [H] here taken in its wider signification of 'food' (cf. Dan. V, 1). The Mem of [H] (of but not all food) indicates limitation.
19. The limitation implied by the Mem. V. supra n. 16.
20. By her father; even when his daughter returns to his house and resumes her right to eat terumah. Before marriage, a daughter's vows may be invalidated by her father. Cf. Num. XXX, 4ff.
21. Num. XXX, 10.
22. And since none of them could in consequence annul her vows, it is obvious that such vows stand against her. What need, then, was there for the text of Num. XXX, 10?
23. To her husband's home.
24. Lit., 'how I read about her'.
25. Since she has not reached the house of her husband and has consequently not yet passed entirely out of her father's authority. Hence her father would still have the power of invalidating her vows.
26. And her vows, like those of any other widow, could not be invalidated by her father.
27. Lit., 'but'.
28. V. Keth. 49a.
29. To the enquiry of R. Hisda.
30. Lev. XXII, 13.
31. The breast and the shoulder.
32. Terumah which is regarded as the property of the priests.
33. These are only the remains of certain sacrifices which do not belong to the priests but to the altar, 'the table of the Most High', and are given to the priests as the leavings of His meal.
34. Lev. X, 14.
35. I.e., before their marriage to non-priests, may the breast and the shoulder be eaten by them.
36. A priest's daughter.
37. V. p. 588, n. 16; or the daughter of an Israelite. (V. next note).
38. If she was married, for instance, to an Israelite and after his death resumed her right to eat terumah by virtue of a son whom she previously had by a priest.
39. Since the exclusion of the right to the breast and the shoulder was mentioned in the former case only.
40. That of the woman who derives her right to terumah from her son.
41. Among those entitled to eat terumah.
42. V. Lev. XXII, 13.
43. The daughter who derives her right to terumah from her father.
44. V. supra n. 3.
45. Who is not eligible to eat terumah, because she is not completely returned to her father's house, being still bound to the levir.
46. Who, being with child, does not return as in her youth.
47. That a pregnant woman, like one who has a born child, does not regain her right to eat terumah.
48. A woman whose husband died without issue is not exempt from the levirate marriage, though she may have a son by a former husband.
49. A pregnant woman is not subject to the levirate marriage.
50. A priest's daughter whose Israelite husband died without issue is forbidden to eat terumah, just as if she had had a son by him, if she had a son by any former Israelite husband of hers. Now, since the law could be arrived at by inference a minori ad majus, the Scriptural text stating the same law is, surely, superfluous!
51. Lit., 'what (reasoning) for me'!
52. A child whose death occurred after the death of his father exempts his mother from the levirate marriage as if he were still alive.
53. Only a live child deprives his mother, the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite, from her right to eat terumah after the death of her husband. As soon as the child dies his mother regains her lost right.
54. Lev. XXII, 13.
55. Cf. BaH. Cur. edd. omit 'As … exclude'.
56. Lit., 'and it was necessary to write'.
57. So BaH. Cur. edd. omit, 'To exclude … child'.
58. Before her marriage.
59. Mother and born child.
60. As in her youth.

was empty and now it is full, but not [a woman whose child was already born],¹  whose body was at first empty and is now also empty, [hence was the first text²  also] required.³

(Mnemonic.⁴  He said to him: Let us not make⁵  and make⁶  in death; let us make and not make in the child of the levir and terumah.)⁷

Said Rab Judah of Diskarta⁸  to Raba: The dead should not be given⁹  the same status as the living, in respect of the levirate marriage, by inference a minori ad majus: If where a child by the first husband is regarded as the child of the second husband, in respect of disqualifying the woman from the eating of terumah,¹⁰  the dead were not given the same status as the living,¹¹  how much less should the dead be given the same status as the living¹²  where the child of the first husband is not regarded as the son of the second, in respect of exempting the woman from the levirate marriage!¹³  It was expressly stated, Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.¹⁴

Then let the dead be given¹⁵  the same status as the living in respect of terumah by inference a minori ad majus: If where a child by the first husband is not regarded as the child of the second In respect of exempting the woman from the levirate marriage,¹³  the dead were given the same status as the living,¹⁶  how much more so should the dead be given the same status as the living¹⁷  where a child of the first husband is regarded as the son of the second, in respect of disqualifying the woman from terumah!¹⁸  It was expressly stated, And [she] have no child¹⁹  and she, surely, has none.²⁰

Let the child of the first husband be regarded as the child of the second husband in respect of the levirate marriage by inference a minori ad majus: If where the dead were not given the same status as the living, in respect of terumah²¹  the child of the first husband is regarded as the son of the second,²²  how much more should the child of the first husband be regarded as the child of the second²³  where the dead were given the status of the living in respect of the levirate marriage!²¹  — It was expressly stated, And [he] have no child,²⁴  and this man, surely, has none.

Then let the child of the first husband not be regarded as the child of the second husband, in respect of terumah, by inference a minori ad majus: If where the dead were given the same status as the living, in respect of exempting her from the levirate marriage, the child of the first husband was not regarded as the child of the second,²²  how much less should the child of the first husband be regarded as the child of the second, where the dead were not regarded as the living in respect of eating terumah!²¹  — It was specifically stated, And [she] have none,²⁵  but she surely has [one].

CHAPTER X

MISHNAH. A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND HAD GONE TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA AND ON BEING TOLD,²⁶  'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD', MARRIED, MUST, IF HER HUSBAND SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED, LEAVE THE ONE AS WELL AS THE OTHER, AND SHE ALSO REQUIRES²⁷  A LETTER OF DIVORCE FROM THE ONE AS WELL AS FROM THE OTHER. SHE HAS NO [CLAIM TO HER] KETHUBAH, USUFRUCT, MAINTENANCE²⁸  OR WORN CLOTHES²⁹  EITHER AGAINST THE FIRST HUSBAND OR AGAINST THE SECOND. IF SHE HAS TAKEN ANYTHING FROM THE ONE OR FROM THE OTHER, SHE MUST RETURN IT. THE CHILD BEGOTTEN BY THE ONE HUSBAND OR BY THE OTHER IS A BASTARD;³⁰  NEITHER OF THEM³¹  MAY DEFILE HIMSELF FOR HER;³²  NEITHER OF THEM HAS A CLAIM TO WHATEVER SHE MAY FIND³³  OR MAKE WITH HER HANDS;³⁴  AND NEITHER HAS THE RIGHT OF INVALIDATING HER VOWS.³⁵  IF SHE WAS THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE, SHE BECOMES DISQUALIFIED FROM MARRYING A PRIEST; IF THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE, FROM THE EATING OF TITHE; AND IF THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST, FROM THE EATING OF TERUMAH. NEITHER THE HEIRS OF THE ONE HUSBAND NOR THE HEIRS OF THE OTHER ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT HER KETHUBAH, AND IF [THE HUSBANDS] DIE, THE BROTHER OF THE ONE AND THE BROTHER OF THE OTHER MUST SUBMIT TO HALIZAH, BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT THE LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. R. JOSE SAID: HER KETHUBAH REMAINS A CHARGE UPON THE ESTATE OF HER FIRST HUSBAND. R. ELEAZAR SAID: THE FIRST HUSBAND IS ENTITLED TO WHATEVER SHE MAY FIND, OR MAKE WITH HER HANDS, AND ALSO HAS THE RIGHT OF INVALIDATING HER VOWS. R. SIMEON SAID: HER COHABITATION OR HALIZAH WITH THE BROTHER OF THE FIRST HUSBAND EXEMPTS HER RIVAL,³⁶  AND A CHILD BEGOTTEN BY HIM³⁷  IS NOT A BASTARD. IF SHE MARRIED WITHOUT AN AUTHORIZATION³⁸  SHE MAY RETURN TO HIM.³⁷  IF³⁹  SHE MARRIED WITH THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE BETH DIN,⁴⁰  SHE MUST LEAVE,⁴¹  BUT IS EXEMPT FROM AN OFFERING.⁴²  IF SHE MARRIED, HOWEVER, WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE BETH DIN, SHE MUST LEAVE⁴¹  AND IS ALSO LIABLE TO AN OFFERING. THE AUTHORITY OF THE BETH DIN IS THUS MORE EFFECTIVE IN THAT IT EXEMPTS HER FROM THE OFFERING. IF THE BETH DIN RULED⁴³  THAT SHE MAY BE MARRIED AGAIN AND SHE WENT AND DISGRACED HERSELF⁴⁴  SHE⁴⁵  MUST BRING AN OFFERING, BECAUSE THE BETH DIN PERMITTED HER ONLY TO MARRY.⁴⁶

GEMARA. Since in the final clause it was stated, IF SHE MARRIES WITHOUT PERMISSION SHE MAY RETURN TO HIM, [which means obviously], without the authorization of the Beth din but [in reliance on the evidence] of witnesses, the first clause, it is to be inferred, [speaks of a woman who married] with the permission of the Beth din and on the evidence of a sing]e witness.⁴⁷  Thus it clearly follows that one witness is trusted. Furthermore, we learned: The practice was adopted of allowing a marriage on the evidence of one witness reporting⁴⁸  another single witness, and of a woman reporting another woman, and of a woman reporting a bondman or a bondwoman;⁴⁹  from which it is obvious that one witness is trusted. Furthermore we learned: [The man to whom] one witness said, 'You have eaten⁵⁰  suet',⁵¹  and who replied, 'I have not eaten', is exempt.⁵²  Now the reason [for his exemption is] because he said, 'l have not eaten'; had he, however, remained silent [the witness] would have been trusted.⁵³  From this it is clearly evident that one witness is trusted in accordance with Pentateuchal law;⁵⁴  whence is this⁵⁵  deduced? From what was taught: If his sin … be known to him,⁵⁶  but not when others have made it known to him. As it might have been assumed that even where he does not contradict the evidence he is exempt, it was expressly stated, If … be known to him,⁵⁷  in any manner.⁵⁸  Now, how is this statement to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers to a case] where two witnesses appeared, and he does not contradict them, what need then was there for a Scriptural text!⁵⁹  Must it not then refer to the case of⁶⁰  one witness, and yet [we see that] when the accused does not contradict him he is trusted.⁶¹  From this, then, it maybe inferred that one witness is to be trusted.⁵⁴  But whence is it inferred that [the reason⁶²  is] because he is trusted? Is it not possible that it is due to the fact that the other had remained silent, silence being regarded as an admission! You can have proof that this is so,⁶³  since in the final clause it was stated: [A man to whom] two witnesses said, 'You have eaten⁶⁴  suet,⁶⁵  and who replied. 'I have not eaten', is exempt; but R. Meir declares him guilty. Said R. Meir: This⁶⁶  may be inferred a minori ad majus. If two witnesses may bring upon a man the severe penalty of death, should they not be able to bring upon him the minor penalty of a sacrifice! The others replied: What if he desired to say, 'I have acted presumptuously'!⁶⁷  Now, in the first clause,⁶⁸

1. Lit., 'have no child' (Lev. XXII, 13) i.e., a woman who has a born child and whose case was deduced from this text.
2. And have no child.
3. To indicate that a born child also deprives his mother of her right to terumah.
4. An aid to the memorisation of the following four arguments.
5. The verb 'to make', [H] is rendered in the following discussions by various equivalents in accordance with the requirements of English idiom.
6. Cur. edd. 'her deeds', [H], is apparently a substitute for this reading, [H], which agrees with MS.M.
7. Cur. edd. repeat, 'levirate marriage and terumah'. MS.M. gives it only once.
8. [Deskarah, N.E. of Bagdad. Obermeyer. p. 146].
9. Lit., 'let us not make'. Cf. mnemonic supra.
10. V. supra p. 589, n. 14.
11. V. supra p. 590, n. 2.
12. And consequently not exempt his mother from the levirate marriage.
13. V. supra p. 589, n. 12.
14. Prov. III, 17. Were a woman, whose child died after its father, to be subjected to the obligations of the levirate marriage, the peace and the pleasantness of family life might be disturbed where the woman, for instance, happened to have married after the death of her husband and the child died subsequently.
15. Cf. supra note 3.
16. Cf. supra p. 590, n. 1.
17. And consequently disqualify his mother from the right of eating of terumah.
18. Cf. supra p. 589, n. 14.
19. Lev. XXII, 13.
20. Hence the permission to eat terumah.
21. Cf. supra p. 590, n. 2.
22. Cf. supra p. 589, n. 12.
23. And consequently exempt his mother from the levirate marriage.
24. Deut. XXV, 5.
25. Lev. XXII, 13.
26. Lit., 'and they came and said to her'. This, as will be explained infra, refers to evidence given by a single witness.
27. If she desires to marry again.
28. Even for the period during which she lived with him.
29. Neither compensation for those that were entirely destroyed nor the clothes themselves should the tatters still be in existence.
30. Pentateuchally if begotten by the second husband; Rabbinically if by the first who resumed living with her.
31. If a priest.
32. If she died. Cf. Lev. XXI, 1ff.
33. A woman's find belongs to her lawful husband. Cf. B.M. 12a.
34. To which a lawful husband is entitled in return for her maintenance.
35. V. Num. XXX. 7ff.
36. From the levirate marriage and halizah.
37. Her first husband, after his return.
38. Of the Beth din; i.e., if she married on the strength of the evidence of two witnesses who testified to her husband's death, in which case no authorization by a court is required.
39. When only one witness testified to the death of her husband.
40. And her first husband subsequently returned.
41. Her second husband.
42. Since she has acted on a ruling of the Beth din. Cf. Hor. 2a.
43. Lit., 'they taught her' or 'directed her'.
44. By immoral conduct. V. infra 922 for fuller explanation.
45. If her first husband subsequently returns.
46. I.e., to contract a lawful marriage, not a forbidden one.
47. Cf. supra p. 593, n. 1.
48. Lit., 'from the mouth'.
49. Infra 122a, Shab. 145a, Bek. 46b.
50. Unwittingly.
51. [H] forbidden fat.
52. From bringing a sin-offering (cf. Lev. IV, 27ff), Kid. 65b, Ker. 11b.
53. And a beast would have been offered as a sin-offering though its sanctity was entirely dependent on one man's word.
54. Had such evidence been Pentateuchally inadmissible, the sin-offering would consist of a Pentateuchally unconsecrated beast which must not be offered on the altar and is also forbidden to be eaten by the priests.
55. The admissibility of one man's evidence.
56. Lev. IV, 28; only then must he bring a sin-offering.
57. Ibid.
58. Cf. Ker. 11b.
59. Two witnesses are, surely, always relied upon.
60. Lit., 'but not'.
61. And an offering is brought upon the altar on the basis of his word. Cf. supra n. 7.
62. For the obligation of an offering.
63. Lit., 'you may know' that the reason is because silence is regarded as an admission.
64. Unwittingly.
65. [H] forbidden fat.
66. That the evidence of the two witnesses is accepted despite the denial of the accused.
67. For a presumptuous sin no sin-offering is brought. In such a case the evidence of the witnesses would be of no value. They can only testify to one's action but not to one's motive or state of mind. Since the accused could annul the evidence by such a plea he is also believed when he simply contradicts the evidence.
68. Where the accusation comes from one witness.