Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 7a

If the Temple service which is of high importance and supersedes the Sabbath¹  is itself superseded by [a death sentence for] murder, as it is said, Thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die,²  how much more reasonable is it that the Sabbath which is superseded by the Temple service should be superseded by [a death sentence for] murder'. How, then, could it be said, 'Or it might rather [etc.]'?³  — He means this: The burial of a meth mizwah⁴  might prove [the contrary], since it supersedes the Temple service⁵  and does not nevertheless supersede the Sabbath.⁶  Then⁷  he argued: It might be inferred a minori ad majus that the burial of a meth mizwah should supersede the Sabbath, [thus]: If the Temple service which super sedes the Sabbath is superseded by the burial of a meth mizwah, by deduction from Or for his sister,⁸  how much more should the Sabbath which is superseded by the Temple service be superseded by the burial of a meth mizwah; hence it was explicitly stated, Ye shall kindle no fire.⁹  [etc].¹⁰

According to our previous assumption, however, that a positive precept supersedes a prohibition, what is meant by, 'Or it might rather [etc.]'?¹¹  — It is this that was meant: 'As regards the application of the text, Every one that profaneth it¹²  shall surely be put to death,¹³  it might have been said to apply to the several kinds of labour other than the execution of a judicial death sentence, but that a judicial death sentence does supersede the Sabbath, for a positive precept¹⁴  supersedes the prohibition. Then¹⁵  he argued: It might be suggested that a positive precept supersedes a prohibition in the case of a mere prohibition only; has it, however, been heard to supersede a prohibition which involves kareth? Then he concluded: 'Even where¹⁶  a positive precept supersedes a prohibition, is not the prohibition of a more serious nature than the precept?¹⁷  And yet the positive precept comes and supersedes the prohibited; on what grounds, then, should a distinction be made between a minor and a major prohibition?¹⁸  Hence it was explicitly stated, Ye shall kindle no fire⁹  [etc.].'¹⁹

But²⁰  [this is the reason why a specific text] was needed:²¹  It might have been assumed that this [case of a] brother's wife should be regarded as a subject which was included in a general proposition²²  and was subsequently singled out in order to predicate another law,²³  the predication of which is not intended to apply to itself alone but to the whole of the general proposition. For it was taught: 'A subject which was included in a general proposition and was subsequently singled out, etc. How [is this to be understood]? But the soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings [that pertain unto the Lord], having his uncleanness upon him;²⁴  were not peace-offerings included among the other holy things?²⁵  Why, then, were they subsequently singled out? In order that [the others] may be compared to them, and in order to tell you that as peace-offerings are distinguished by being consecrated objects of the altar so must also all other things²⁶  be consecrated objects of the altar, the objects consecrated for Temple repair only being excluded.'²⁷  Similarly here it might have been argued:²⁸  Since a brother's wife was included among all the other forbidden relatives, why was she singled out? In order that [the others] may be compared to her, and in order to tell you that as a brother's wife is permitted²⁹  so also are all the other forbidden relatives permitted.³⁰

Are these, however, similar? There,³¹  both the general proposition³²  and the particular specification²⁴  relate to a prohibition, but here³³  the general proposition relates to a prohibition while the particular specification relates to something which is permitted!³⁴  This, surely, is rather to be compared to an object that was included in a general proposition and was subsequently singled out in order to be made the subject of a fresh statement, which you cannot restore to the restrictions of the general proposition unless Scripture specifically restores it; for it was taught: Anything which was included in a general proposition and was subsequently excluded in order to be made the subject of a fresh statement, cannot be restored to the restrictions of the general proposition unless Scripture has explicitly restored it.³⁵  How³⁶  [may this principle be illustrated]? And he shall kill the he-lamb in the place where they kill the sin-offering and the burnt-offering in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest's so is the guilt-offering.³⁷  Now since there was no need to state, 'As the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering.'³⁸  why did Scripture explicitly state. As the sin-offering so the guilt-offering? Because seeing that the guilt-offering of the leper was singled out³⁹  in order to impart a new law concerning the thumb of the right hand and the great toe of the right foot,⁴⁰  it might have been assumed that it required no application of blood to, and no burning of the prescribed portions of the sacrifice upon the altar;

1. Labour prohibited on the Sabbath may be performed in connection with the service of the Temple.
2. Ex. XXI, 14. This is taken to mean that he may he removed from the altar even if he has to perform service thereon.
3. Supra 6b. Since the inference was made a minori ad majus how could anyone dispute it?
4. V. Glos.
5. A priest may defile himself by the burial of a meth mizwah though he thereby becomes disqualified from performing the Temple service. V. Meg. 3b.
6. Burial is forbidden on the Sabbath. So also, it could be argued, the execution of a death sentence, though it supersedes the Temple service, need not necessarily supersede the Sabbath.
7. Saying again, 'Or it might rather etc.', supra 6b.
8. Num. VI, 7; v. Meg. 3b.
9. Ex. XXXV, 3.
10. For the continuation, v. supra 6b.
11. Cf. supra p. 27, n. 8. How, in view of this assumption, could any other conclusion be arrived at?
12. The Sabbath.
13. Ex. XXXI, 14.
14. That the man worthy of death be put to death (v. Deut. XXI, 22).
15. By saying again, 'Or it might rather', supra 6b.
16. Cf. BaH, a.l.
17. A transgression of the prohibition involves the serious penalty of flogging, while the non-performance of the precept is no punishable offence.
18. As a positive precept supersedes an ordinary prohibition so it should also supersede one which involves kareth.
19. V. supra note 3.
20. Now that it is concluded that the need of the Scriptural text prohibiting the execution of a death sentence on Sabbath is because otherwise the permissibility thereof might have been argued a minori, and not on the ground of the principle that a positive command supersedes a prohibition, there is no proof available for the assumption that a positive precept supersedes a prohibition which involves kareth, and thus the original question again arises: What need was there for the specific text of Lev. XVIII, 18, ''aleha' (supra p. 8), to indicate the obvious? (i.e., that the positive precept of the levirate marriage does not supersede the prohibition of marrying a consanguineous relative).
21. V. previous note.
22. The prohibition of incest, Lev. XVIII, 29.
23. The marriage of the widow of a deceased childless brother.
24. Lev. VII, 20.
25. Lev. XXII, 3, where the penalty of kareth is pronounced for eating consecrated things during one's uncleanness.
26. For the eating of which during one's uncleanness the penalty of kareth is incurred.
27. Ker. 2b. If these were eaten by one in a state of uncleanness no obligation is incurred.
28. Reading with BaH [H]. Cur. edd. retain [H] with no sign of abbreviation.
29. To be married to the levir if her husband died childless.
30. Cf. previous note. A text was consequently needed to intimate that the law was not so,
31. The case of consecrated objects.
32. Lev. XXII, 3.
33. Levirate marriage and forbidden relatives.
34. How, then, could the two be compared?
35. Now, as the case of a brother's wife has not been restored to the general proposition, what need was there for the specific text of Lev. XVIII, 18?
36. This is the continuation of the quotation.
37. Lev. XIV, 13, dealing with the leper's guilt-offering.
38. Since the place of killing was indicated at the beginning of the verse while the other regulations concerning this sacrifice are found in the laws of the guilt-offering in Lev. VII, 1ff.
39. From the laws relating to other guilt-offerings.
40. V. Lev. XIV, 14.

hence it was explicitly stated, 'As the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering': As the sin-offering¹  requires application of the blood to, and burning of the prescribed portions upon the altar, so does the guilt-offering also require application of the blood to, and burning of the prescribed portions upon the altar.²  Had Scripture not restored it,³  however, it would have been assumed that it was singled out only in respect of what was explicitly specified but not in any other respect;⁴  so also here,⁵  I would assume, only a brother's wife who was explicitly mentioned [can be said] to be permitted⁶  but not any of the other forbidden relatives!⁷

But⁸  it might have been assumed that the law of a wife's sister⁹  should be deduced from what has been found in the case of a brother's wife; as a levir may marry his brother's wife so he may also marry his wife's sister.¹⁰

Are, however, the two cases¹¹  similar? In the one case¹²  there is only one prohibition; in the other¹³  there are two prohibitions!¹⁴  — It might have been assumed that since she¹⁵  was permitted¹⁶  [in respect of one prohibition]¹⁷  she was also permitted [in the case of the other].¹⁸  And whence is it derived that we assume that 'since something was permitted [in one respect] it was also permitted [in the other]'? — From what was taught: In the case of a leper whose eighth day [of purification]¹⁹  fell on the Passover eve,²⁰  and who, having observed a discharge of semen on that day,²¹  had taken a ritual bath, the Sages said: Although no other tebul yom²²  may enter [the Temple mount],²³  this one²⁴  may enter, for it is better that the positive precept,²⁵  the non-observance of which involves kareth, shall supersede a positive precept²⁶  the infringement of which involves no kareth.²⁷  And in connection with this R. Johanan said: According to the Torah, not even [the infringement of] a positive precept is involved,²⁸  for it is said, And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah … before the new court.²⁹  What is meant by the new court? Rabbi³⁰  replied: That they enacted therein new laws, ordaining that a tebul yom³¹  must not enter the camp of the Levites.³²  And 'Ulla said: 'What is the reason?'³³  Since he was given permission³⁴  in respect of his leprosy,³⁵  permission was also given to him in respect of his discharge of the semen.³⁶  But is this case³⁷  similar to that of 'Ulla?

1. Of a leper.
2. Zeb. 49a.
3. The leper's guilt-offering and brought it into line with other guilt-offerings.
4. Lit., 'to what it went out, it went out; and to what it did not go out, it did not go out'.
5. The case of the levirate marriage.
6. Lit., 'that was permitted is permitted'.
7. The question consequently arises again: What need was there for ''aleha' in Lev. XVIII, 18. (Cf. supra p. 30, n. s).
8. The reason why a superfluous text (v. previous note) was needed.
9. For this reading v. BaH.
10. Hence it was necessary to have the superfluous text, ''aleha' (v. supra n. 4) to shew that the law was not so.
11. Brother's wife and wife's sister.
12. Lit., 'there', a brother's wife.
13. Lit., 'here', a wife's sister.
14. The prohibitions to marry (a) a brother's wife and (b) a wife's sister. How then could the one be deduced from the other?
15. A brother's wife who is also one's wife's sister and whose husband died childless.
16. By the positive precept of the levirate marriage.
17. That of marrying a brother's wife.
18. The prohibition of marrying one's wife's sister. Hence etc. V. supra note 7.
19. On which he completes the days of his purification and brings the prescribed sacrifices, presenting himself (whither as a leper he was till that day forbidden to enter) on the Temple mount at the entrance to the Nikanor gate of the Sanctuary, from where he extends his thumb and great toe into the Sanctuary (whither he is not yet allowed to enter) for the priest to apply to them some of the sacrificial blood, v. Nazir, Sonc. ed. p. 165ff.
20. When the paschal lamb is sacrificed to be eaten in the evening.
21. Such a discharge ordinarily disqualifies a man from entering the Temple mount.
22. [H] one who has had his ritual bath and is awaiting nightfall for the completion of his purification.
23. Before nightfall.
24. The leper in the circumstances mentioned.
25. That of the paschal lamb.
26. That a leper like certain other unclean persons must be sent out from the Levitical camp in which the Temple mount is included.
27. If he were not allowed to enter the Temple mount his purification from leprosy could not have been completed (cf. supra p. 31, n. 16) and he would in consequence have been prevented from participating in the paschal lamb. By allowing him to enter he is enabled to complete his purification, while nightfall would also terminate the uncleanness due to the discharge, and thus he is in a position to participate in the evening in the paschal lamb which during the day is prepared for him by a deputy.
28. In allowing the leper in the conditions mentioned to enter the Temple court.
29. II Chron. XX, 5, referring to a day when Israel completed a period of purification.
30. This is the reading also in Zeb. 32b. Cur. edd. enclose in parentheses 'R. Johanan'.
31. V. Glos.
32. Which proves that the prohibition for a tebul yom to enter the Levitical camp was not of Pentateuchal origin, having been first enacted in the days of Jehoshaphat.
33. Why was a leper in the circumstances mentioned permitted to extend his hands into the Sanctuary whither an unclean person, according to 'Ulla, may not project even part of his body?
34. To project his hands into the Sanctuary.
35. Despite the prohibition for an unclean person, though the days of his purification have been duly observed, to enter the Sanctuary even partially, prior to the offering of the prescribed sacrifices.
36. Thus it is proved that since something was permitted in one respect the permission remains in force even when another prohibition may be involved in another respect. The same argument might have also applied to a wife's sister or widow of a deceased brother. Hence the need of the text, ''aleha'.
37. A brother's wife who is also one's wife's sister.