Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 40a

for originally¹  its status in relation to him was one of permissibility; then²  it was forbidden, and again³  permitted; consequently one might assume that it reverts to its first status of permissibility, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place,⁴  it is a commandment'. Now, according to Raba who said that it⁵  represents the view of⁶  the Rabbis, one could well explain that what is meant here⁷  is this: It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place⁴  is a commandment, for at first⁸  its status in relation to him was one of permissibility since, if he desired, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it; then⁹  it was forbidden, and again³  permitted; consequently it might be assumed that it reverts to its first status of permissibility¹⁰  so that, if he wished, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it. — [You say,] 'If he preferred he could abstain from eating it'? Surely it is written in the Scriptures, And they shall eat those things wherewith atonement was made¹¹  which teaches that the priests must eat them, and that the owner attains thereby atonement! Say rather: [it might be assumed that] if he wished, he¹²  may eat it¹³  himself and, if he preferred, another priest may eat it, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten' without leaven in a holy place,¹⁴  it is a commandment.¹⁵  According to R. Isaac b. Abdimi, however, who said that it¹⁶  [represents the view of] Abba Saul, what two alternatives¹⁷  exist here?¹⁸  And were you to suggest¹⁹  that if he wished he could eat it¹³  to appease his appetite and, if he preferred, he could devour it gluttonously can eating gluttonous]y [it may be retorted] be described as proper eating? Surely Resh Lakish said, 'He who eats gluttonously on the Day of Atonement²⁰  is exempt [from kareth],²¹  since [Scripture has stated], Shall not be afflicted'!²²  [Were you to suggest], however,²³  that if he wished he could eat it²⁴  unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it leavened, surely [it might be retorted] it is written in Scripture, It shall not be baked with leaven their portion²⁵  from which Resh Lakish inferred that even their portion²⁶  must not be baked with leaven! Again [Were you, to suggest,]²³  that if he wished he could eat it²⁴  unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it as a dumpling,²⁷  how [it could be retorted] is one to imagine [such a dumpling]? If it is unleavened, well, then it is unleavened;²⁸  and if it is not unleavened, the All Merciful, surely, has said without leaven!²⁹  — No;³⁰  it³¹  may indeed be assumed to be unleavened; but the object of the exposition of the Scriptural text³²  was to forbid it.³³  In respect of what practical issue, then,³⁴  has it been stated that a dumpling may be regarded as unleavened bread? — [The statement was made] to indicate that a man may perform with it³¹  his duty³⁵  on the Passover. Though he made it first into a dumpling, it is nevertheless designated the 'bread of affliction', since he subsequently baked it in an oven. Consequently a man may perform with it his duty³⁵  on the Passover.

MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS IN RESPECT OF INHERITANCE.³⁶  IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER³⁷  WAS LIVING,³⁸  THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER.³⁹

HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE GAINS POSSESSION OF HIS BROTHER'S³⁷  ESTATE. R. JUDAH SAID: IN EITHER CASE,⁴⁰  IF THE FATHER³⁷  WAS LIVING³⁸  THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER.

GEMARA. Is not this⁴¹  obvious? — It might have been presumed that halizah takes the place of the levirate marriage and he receives, therefore, all the estate, hence it was taught [that he does not].⁴²  If so,⁴³  why was it stated that HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS when it should have been stated, he is to be regarded only as one of the brothers! — In truth [this is the purpose of our Mishnah]: It might have been assumed that because he deprived her [of levirate marriage]⁴⁴  he shall be penalized,⁴⁵  hence we were taught [that he does receive a share].

IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER WAS LIVING, [THE ESTATE BELONGS TO HIM], for a Master said that a father takes precedence over all his lineal descendants.⁴⁶

HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE etc. What is the reason? — The All Merciful said, Shall succeed in the name of his brother,⁴⁷  and behold he⁴⁸  has succeeded.

R. JUDAH SAID etc. Said 'Ulla: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, and R. Isaac Nappaha likewise said: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.

'Ulla, furthermore, (others say, R. Isaac Nappaha) said: What is R. Judah's reason? — Because it is written in Scripture, And it shall be, that the firstborn that he beareth,⁴⁹  [he is] like the firstborn; as the firstborn has nothing while his father is alive, so has this one⁵⁰  also nothing while his father is alive. If [one were to suggest that] as the firstborn receives a double portion after his father's death so shall this one also receive a double portion⁵¹  after his father's death, [it might be retorted]: Is it written, 'Shall succeed in the name of his father'? It is written, surely, Shall succeed in the name of his brother,⁵²  not 'in the name of his father'.⁵³  Might it be suggested that, where the father is not alive to receive the inheritance,⁵⁴  the law of the levirate marriage should be carried out, but where the father is alive [and the levir] does not receive the inheritance the law of the levirate marriage shall not be carried out? — Has the All Merciful in any way made the levirate marriage dependent on the inheritance? The levir must contract the levirate marriage in any case, and if any inheritance is available he receives it; if not, he does not receive it.

The Bible teacher, R. Hanina, once sat before R. Jannai, and as he sat there he stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other called out to him: Go out, read Biblical verses outside;⁵⁵  the halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah.

A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: The halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. The other said to him: In agreement with whom, then? In agreement with the Rabbis? This is surely obvious, [since in a dispute between] one individual and a majority the halachah is in agreement with the majority! — 'Shall I', the first asked him, 'reject it'?⁵⁶  'No', the other replied, 'you were taught [that] the halachah is [in agreement with R. Judah] which, presenting to you a difficulty,⁵⁷  you reversed;⁵⁸  and in so far as you reversed it your wording is well justified.⁵⁹

MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS RELATIVES:⁶⁰

1. Before its ingredients were consecrated.
2. When its ingredients were consecrated as a meal-offering,
3. When the 'handful' (v. Lev. VI, 8) had been offered up upon the altar.
4. V. p. 254, n. 12.
5. The first clause of the Baraitha cited.
6. Lit., 'this, whose'.
7. In the second clause which presumably represents the views of the same authors.
8. Before its ingredients were consecrated.
9. When its ingredients were consecrated as a meal-offering.
10. Cur. edd. enclose 'then it was forbidden … permissibility' in parentheses.
11. Ex. XXIX, 33.
12. The priest who performed the ceremonial.
13. The meal-offering.
14. Lev. VI, 9, dealing with the laws of the meal-offering.
15. [H] That the first priest (v. supra n. 10) shall eat it.
16. The first clause of the Baraitha cited.
17. Analogous to those in the first clause.
18. Acting (a) with, and (b) without the intention of fulfilling the commandment, which are the alternatives in the case of the levirate marriage in the first clause, are obviously inapplicable here, since whatever be the motive of one's eating, no prohibition, such as is the case with levirate marriages, is thereby infringed.
19. As the two alternatives.
20. When eating is prohibited.
21. V. Glos.
22. And whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted in that same day, he shall be cut off from his people (Lev. XXIII, 29). An excessive meal being injurious to the body is deemed to be an affliction. Now, since such a meal is not regarded as eating in the case of the Day of Atonement, how could it be regarded as proper eating in the case of a meal offering?
23. As the two alternatives.
24. The meal-offering.
25. Lev. VI, 20.
26. That of the priests, the remnants of the meal-offering.
27. [H] (rt. [H] 'to mix'), a paste prepared by stirring flour in hot water.
28. And is not forbidden at all.
29. Take the meal-offering … and eat it without leaven (Lev. X, 12); what need then was there for repeating the same prohibition in Lev. VI, 9?
30. The eating of the meal-offering with leaven is not one of the alternatives.
31. The dumpling.
32. In the first clause of the Baraitha cited.
33. Lit., 'to prevent'. A meal-offering may not be prepared in the form of a dumpling even though that paste is unleavened.
34. Since a meal-offering which must be unleavened may not be prepared in the form of a dumpling.
35. Of eating unleavened bread. Cf. Ex. XII, 18.
36. Of the estate of the deceased brother.
37. Of the deceased brother.
38. Lit., 'if there is'.
39. A father takes precedence over a brother in respect of inheritance. V. B.B. 115a and infra.
40. Whether the levir married, or submitted to the halizah from his sister-in-law.
41. That participation in the halizah does not deprive the levir of his share in his brother's estate.
42. The object of our Mishnah is not to state that the levir is entitled to a share but that he is not entitled to all the estate.
43. That the object of our Mishnah is to indicate his disadvantage. V. supra n. 7.
44. Halizah with him has placed the widow under the prohibition of marrying any of the brothers.
45. And shall receive no share at all.
46. B.B. 115a. V. supra note 4.
47. Deut. XXV, 6.
48. The levir who, according to Rabbinic interpretation (v. supra 24a), is the subject of shall succeed.
49. Deut. XXV, 6.
50. The levir.
51. His own and his brother's.
52. Ibid.
53. And since he is not entitled to a double portion at the time he steps into the place of his brother he cannot subsequently claim such a portion when he ultimately becomes entitled to a share in the same estate only by virtue of his succession to his father.
54. Which consequently passes over into the possession of the levir.
55. V. Keth., Sonc. ed. p. 328, n, 7.
56. As a superfluous addition.
57. How could the halachah be in agreement with an individual against the rule of a majority?
58. Stating, 'the halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah.
59. Lit., 'you reversed well'. [He, however, forgot that he had reversed it; cf, supra 33b, v. Strashun].
60. All relatives that are Biblically forbidden to husband and wife respectively are Rabbinically forbidden to levir and haluzah respectively.

HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER MOTHER, HER MOTHER'S MOTHER AND HER FATHER S MOTHER; HER DAUGHTER, HER DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER AND HER SON'S DAUGHTER; AND ALSO HER SISTER WHILE SHE¹  IS ALIVE. THE OTHER BROTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE PERMITTED.²  SHE¹  IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS FATHER AND HIS FATHER'S FATHER;³  HIS SON AND HIS SON'S SON; HIS BROTHER AND HIS BROTHER'S SON.

A MAN IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE RELATIVE OF THE RIVAL OF HIS HALUZAH BUT IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY THE RIVAL OF THE RELATIVE OF HIS HALUZAH.

GEMARA. The question was raised: Were relatives of the second degree⁴  forbidden⁵  in the case of a haluzah as a preventive measure,⁶  or not? Did the Rabbis forbid marriage with relatives of the second degree, as a preventive measure,⁶  only in respect of a relative who is pentateuchally forbidden,⁷  but in respect of a haluzah⁸  the Rabbis did not forbid relatives of the second degree as a preventive measure, or is there perhaps no difference?⁹  — Come and hear: HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER MOTHER AND HER MOTHER'S MOTHER, but 'her mother's mother's mother' is not mentioned!¹⁰  [No.] It is possible that the reason why this relative was omitted¹¹  is because it was desired to state in the final clause, THE OTHER BROTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE PERMITTED, and, were 'her mother's mother's mother' also mentioned it might have been presumed that the brothers are permitted [to marry] her mother's mother's mother only¹²  but not her mother's mother or her mother.¹³  Then let 'her mother's mother's mother' be mentioned, and let it also be stated: The brothers are permitted to marry all of them!¹⁴  — This is a difficulty.

Come and hear: SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS FATHER AND HIS FATHER'S FATHER. 'His father's father,' at any rate, was mentioned. Is not this¹⁵  due to¹⁶  the levir who participated in the halizah, through whom she is the daughter-in-law of his¹⁷  son?¹⁸  — No; this¹⁹  is due to the deceased through whom she is the daughter-in-law of his²⁰  son.²¹

Come and hear: AND HIS SON'S SON, Is not this¹⁹  due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is the wife of his²²  father's father?¹⁸  — No; it¹⁹  is due to the deceased through whom she is his²²  father's father's brother's wife.²¹  But, surely, Amemar permitted the marriage of one's father's father's brother's wife!²³  — Amemar interprets that²⁴  to refer to the son of the grandfather.²⁵  If so, [HIS SON, AND SON'S SON] are the same as HIS BROTHER AND HIS BROTHER'S SON!²⁶  — Both his paternal brother and his maternal brother were specified.²⁷

Come and hear what R. Hiyya taught:²⁸  Four [categories of relatives are forbidden]²⁹  Pentateuchally³⁰  and four Rabbinically.³¹  His³²  father and his³³  son, his³⁴  brother and his³⁵  brother's son are Pentateuchally forbidden;³⁰  his father's father³⁶  and his mother's father,³⁷  his son's son³⁸  and his daughter's son³⁹  are forbidden Rabbinically.⁴⁰  'His father's father', at any rate, is mentioned here. Is not this⁴¹  due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his son's daughter-in-law?⁴²  — No; it⁴¹  is due to the deceased⁴³  whose son's daughter-in-law she is.

Come and hear: 'His mother's father'.⁴⁴  Is not this⁴¹  due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his⁴⁵  daughter's daughter-in-law?⁴⁶  — No; it⁴¹  is due to the deceased⁴⁷  through whom she is his⁴⁵  daughter's daughter-in-law.

Come and hear: 'And his son's son'.⁴⁸  Is not this⁴¹  due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his father's father's wife?⁴²  — No; it⁴¹  is due to the deceased⁴⁷  through whom she is his father's father's brother's wife. But, surely, Amemar permitted the marriage of one's father's father's brother's wife!⁴⁹  — Amemar explains that⁵⁰  to be due to the levir who participated in the halizah,⁵¹  but is of the opinion that relatives of the second degree were forbidden as a preventive measure even in respect of a haluzah.⁵²

Come and hear: 'And the son of his daughter'.⁴⁸  Is not this⁴¹  due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his mother's father's wife?⁴²  — No; it⁴¹  is due to the deceased⁴⁷  through whom she is his mother's father's brother's wife. But, surely, no prohibition as a preventive measure was made in respect of the second degrees of incest!⁵³  Consequently⁵⁴  it must be due to the levir who participated in the halizah,⁵⁵  and thus it may be inferred that relatives of the second degree were forbidden as a preventive measure even in the case of a haluzah. This proves it.

A MAN IS PERMITTED etc. R. Tobi b. Kisna said in the name of Samuel: Where a man had intercourse with the rival of his haluzah the child [born from such a union] is a bastard. What is the reason? — Because she⁵⁶  remains under her original prohibition.⁵⁷

Said R. Joseph: We also have learned [to the same effect]: A MAN IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE RELATIVE OF THE RIVAL OF HIS HALUZAH. Now, if you grant that the rival is excluded⁵⁸  one can well understand why the man is permitted to marry her sister.⁵⁹  If it be maintained, however, that the rival has the same status as the haluzah, why [should her sister] be permitted [to him]?⁶⁰

May it be suggested that this⁶¹  furnishes an objection against R. Johanan who stated: Neither he⁶²  nor the other brothers are subject to kareth either for [the betrothal of] a haluzah or for [the betrothal of] her rival?⁶³  — R. Johanan can answer you: Do you understand it!⁶⁴  Is the sister of a haluzah Pentateuchally forbidden?⁶⁵  Surely Resh Lakish said: Here⁶⁶  it was taught by Rabbi that the prohibition to marry the sister of a divorced wife is Pentateuchal and that that of the sister of a haluzah is Rabbinical!⁶⁷

Why is there a difference [in the law] between the one and the other?⁶⁸

1. The haluzah (v. Glos.).
2. To marry the enumerated relatives of the haluzah.
3. Bomberg ed. adds, 'and his mother's father'.
4. E.g., the haluzah's mother's mother's mother or her father's mother's mother (Rashi). Cf. supra 21a.
5. Rabbinically.
6. Against marriage with relatives of the first degree.
7. I.e., a wife's relatives whose prohibition is specifically stated in the Pentateuch.
8. Whose relatives, even of the first degree, are only Rabbinically forbidden.
9. In respect of the law of incest, between the relatives of a wife who are Pentateuchally forbidden and those of a haluzah who are only Rabbinically forbidden.
10. V. supra p. 259, n. 9.
11. Lit., 'that he did not teach'.
12. Because even in the case of one's wife she is not Biblically forbidden.
13. Who, in the case of one's wife, are Pentateuchally prohibited.
14. And the possible misinterpretation would thus be avoided.
15. Prohibition to marry a father's father.
16. Lit., 'what not, owing to'.
17. The father's father.
18. I.e., a relative of the second degree, which proves that even such relatives were forbidden in respect of a haluzah.
19. V. supra note 9.
20. V. supra n. 20.
21. In whose case the prohibition is Pentateuchal and provides no answer to our enquiry.
22. The son's son.
23. Supra 21b. How, then, according to Amemar, could this case be included among forbidden relatives?
24. The SON'S SON in our Mishnah.
25. The father of both the deceased and of the levir who submitted to the halizah. Our Mishnah is thus interpreted: HIS FATHER is the father of the deceased and of the levir who participated in the halizah; HIS SON, i.e., the son of the FATHER mentioned, who is the brother of the deceased and of the levir who participated in the halizah; and HIS SON'S SON is the son of the son of the father mentioned, to whom the haluzah is forbidden as the wife of his father's brother.
26. V. supra n. 1.
27. The former by HIS SON AND HIS SON'S SON (v. supra n. 1) and the latter by HIS BROTHER AND HIS BROTHER'S SON, the prohibitions being Pentateuchal since they are due to the woman's relationship with the deceased as his wife, and not to her relationship with the levir as haluzah, the prohibitions resulting from which could only be Rabbinical.
28. In respect of a haluzah.
29. To marry her.
30. Lit., 'from the words of the Torah', i.e., owing to their relationship to the haluzah as the wife of the deceased, and the prohibition to marry whom is specifically mentioned in the Pentateuch.
31. Lit., 'from the words of the Scribes'.
32. The levir's (who participated in the halizah). The prohibition is Pentateuchal, it being due to his brother, the deceased, whose wife and whose father's daughter-in-law the haluzah was.
33. The levir's (v. supra n. 8). The haluzah is forbidden to him Pentateuchally as the wife of his father's brother.
34. The levir's (v. supra n. 8), who is also the brother of the deceased, and the haluzah is forbidden to him Pentateuchally.
35. The levir's (v supra n. 8), the deceased also having been his father's brother, and the prohibition is consequently Pentateuchal.
36. To whom the haluzah is forbidden as his son's daughter-in-law.
37. The prohibition being that of one's daughter's daughter-in-law.
38. It is now assumed that the prohibition to marry this relative is due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his father's father's wife.
39. Whose mother's father's wife she was.
40. Cf. supra note 7, all being cases of the second degree, forbidden by a provision of the Rabbis only.
41. The prohibition to marry this relative.
42. Which proves that, even in respect of a haluzah, relatives of the second degree are prohibited.
43. In whose case the prohibition is Pentateuchal, and supplies no answer to our enquiry.
44. This is a citation from R. Hiyya's Baraitha supra.
45. His mother's father's.
46. V. supra n. 2.
47. The prohibition being a preventive measure against the infringement of a Pentateuchal law. Consequently it supplies no proof in respect of our enquiry which is concerned with a preventive measure against an infringement of a Rabbinical law.
48. V. supra n. 4.
49. How then could such a case be included among forbidden relatives?
50. 'Son's son' in R. Hiyya's Baraitha.
51. The prohibition being that of 'his father's father's wife', as first assumed.
52. According to those, however, who, contrary to the opinion of Amemar, forbid marriage with a father's father's brother's wife, the prohibition in R. Hiyya's Baraitha might still be attributed to the deceased (v. supra n. 7), and the original enquiry as to whether relatives of the second degree were forbidden in the case of a haluzah still remains unanswered.
53. How then could it be suggested that the prohibition is due to the fact that the haluzah is the 'wife of the mother's father's brother' of the deceased?
54. Lit., 'what, not'?
55. The prohibition being that of 'his mother's father's wife' who is a relative of the second degree.
56. The rival.
57. Of 'brother's wife', which is subject to the penalty of kareth. Children born from a union that is forbidden under such a penalty are deemed to be bastards.
58. [Lit., 'outside'. Rashi reads: 'Stands outside'.] From the restrictions of the haluzah, the latter not being regarded as her agent or representative.
59. Since she herself remains forbidden to the levir as 'brother's wife', her sister is not the 'sister of a haluzah'.
60. She should be forbidden as the sister of a haluzah! As she is permitted, however, it must be granted that the rival of a haluzah remains under the original prohibition of 'brother's wife', which entails the penalty of kareth. (V. supra n. 5).
61. The inference from our Mishnah. (V. supra n. 8 second clause).
62. The levir who submitted to halizah.
63. Supra 10b; while from the inference of our Mishnah, as has been proved, the penalty for contracting a union with the rival of a haluzah is kareth!
64. R. Joseph's argument.
65. As R. Joseph implies by his assumption that if the rival had the same status as the haluzah her sister would be forbidden.
66. In the following Mishnah to which he refers.
67. The reason why the sister of a rival of a haluzah is permitted is not that assumed by R. Joseph. but the following: As the prohibition of the sister of a haluzah herself is only Rabbinical, the prohibition was not extended to the sister of the rival of the haluzah also.
68. The first and second case of the final clause of our Mishnah. THE RIVAL OF THE RELATIVE OF HIS HALUZAH is surely as much of a stranger to him as THE RELATIVE OF THE RIVAL OF HIS HALUZAH.