Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 116a

What possibility can be taken into consideration!¹  If that of loss,²  one is surely careful with [a note of indebtedness];³  if that of a deposit,⁴  since the name of the one is like that of the other the former does not entrust the latter with such a deposit;⁵  what then can be said?⁶  That he⁷  may only have delivered [the note] to him!⁸  'Letters'⁹  [it may be replied] are acquired by mesirah.¹⁰

A letter of divorce was once found at Sura, and in it appeared this entry: 'In the town of Sura, I, Anan son of Hiyya. a Nehardean, released and divorced my wife So-and-so.' Now when the Rabbis searched from Sura to Nehardea [they found that] there was no other Anan son of Hiyya save one Anan son of Hiyya of Hagra¹¹  who was at that time at Nehardea, and witnesses came and declared that on the day on which the letter of divorce was written Anan son of Hiyya of Hagra was with them.¹²  Said Abaye: Even according to me who hold that [the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name] is to be taken into consideration. no such possibility need be considered here,¹³  for [even in respect of the only other man known to have that name] witnesses declared that he was at Nehardea;¹⁴  how then could he [on the same day,] have been¹⁵  at Sura!¹⁶  Raba said: Even according to me who hold that [the possibility of the existence of other men of the same name] is not to be taken into consideration. [such possibility] must be considered here,¹⁷  since [the man in question] may have gone [to Sura] on a flying camel,¹⁸  or¹⁹  [got there] by a miraculous leap,²⁰  or¹⁹  he may have given verbal instructions²¹  [for the letter of divorce to be written²²  on his behalf], as, [in fact] Rab said to his scribes, and R. Huna, similarly, said to his scribes: When you are at Shili²³  write [in any deed] 'At Shili', although the instructions were given to you at Hini,²⁴  and when you are at Hini,²³  write, 'At Hini', although the instructions Were given to you at Shili.²⁵

What is [the decision] in respect of the sesame?²⁶  — R. Yemar ruled: [The possibility that it was removed and replaced by another lot] is not to be taken into consideration; Rabina ruled: It is to be taken into consideration; and the law is that it is to be taken into consideration.

DISCORD BETWEEN HIM AND HER etc. What is to be understood by DISCORD BETWEEN HIM AND HER? Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: When [a wife] says to her husband. 'Divorce me!' Do not all women²⁷  say this?²⁸  Rather [this is the meaning]: When she says to her husband. 'You have divorced me!' Then let her be believed on the strength of R. Hamnuna's ruling; for R. Hamnuna ruled: If a woman said to her husband, 'You have divorced me'. she is believed, for it is an established principle that no woman would dare [to make such a false assertion] in the presence of her husband! — [Here it is a case] where she said. 'You have divorced me in the presence Of So-and-so and So-and-so', who. when asked, stated that this had never happened.²⁹

What is the reason in case Of DISCORD?³⁰  — R Hanina explained: Because she is likely to tell a lie.³¹  R. Shimi b. Ashi explained: Because she speaks from conjecture.³²  What is the practical difference between them?³³

1. In deciding the ownership of a note of indebtedness of the nature if the notes mentioned.
2. That the actual creditor had lost the note and that the man who produced it. whose name is the same as that of the creditor, had found it.
3. The remote and unlikely possibility of loss may. therefore, be completely disregarded.
4. That the holder of the note is not its owner, but only keeper or trustee for another man of the same name as his.
5. Since he knows full well that the keeper might at any moment claim to be the creditor.
6. In justification of the assumption that the man producing the note is not the real creditor.
7. The creditor when selling the note to the man who now utters it.
8. But did not transfer its possession by the usual kinyan. And, since the seller may withdraw' from the sale before legal transfer had taken place, it might be assumed that the creditor named in the note withdrew from the sale and that the man of the same name who now produces the note is not its owner even through purchase.
9. I.e., a note of indebtedness.
10. V. Glos. The delivery of the note completes the legal transfer after which the seller can no longer withdraw. Cf Kid. 47b. p BB 76a. 77a.
11. [Hagronia. a suburb of Nehardea (Obermeyer p. 266)].
12. In Nehardea; while the letter of divorce was written at Sura. Owing to the distance between the two towns it was impossible for him to have been in the one as well as in the other on the same day.
13. Where a search revealed that only one such person lived throughout that region.
14. V. supra n. 2.
15. Lit., 'what did he require'.
16. [The distance between Nehardea and Sura was about twenty parasangs, a travelling journey of two days. v. Obermeyer P. 251].
17. Where it was definitely established that another man of such a name existed.
18. Dromedary (?) V. Mak., Sonc. ed., P. 21, n. 4.
19. Lit., 'or also'.
20. And so it was possible for him to be in both towns on the same day.
21. At Nehardea.
22. In Sura.
23. Shili and Hini were situated near each other (cf. Bezah 25b) on the South of Sura; v. B.B., Sonc. ed., p. 753' n. 6.
24. The place name entered in a legal document is not that of the locality where the transaction which it records took place or the instructions concerning its writing were given, but that of the locality where the document was written.
25. Which proves that it was customary for scribes to write legal documents in one place for people who gave them the necessary instruction in another.
26. Discussed supra 115b.
27. Lit.. 'all of them also'.
28. When they are angry. They do not mean it seriously. Why, then, should a woman, because of a momentary outburst, be suspected of inventing a tale about her husband's death?
29. [H] (abr. [H]), lit.. 'the things never were'.
30. Why is not a wife in such a case believed if she states that her husband is dead?
31. Out of hatred she might deliberately invent the tale that her husband was dead so that by marrying again she might become forbidden to him forever.
32. Though she might not deliberately tell an untruth, her hatred would prevent her from finding out what exactly happened to her husband if ever he was placed in a position of danger. The likelihood of his death would be regarded by ber as a certainty.
33. R. Hanina and R. Shimi. Is not her word mistrusted in either case?

— The practical difference between them arises in the case where [the husband] created¹  the discord.²

The question was raised: What [is the law in respect of] one witness in a case of discord? Is the reason why one witness is [elsewhere]³  believed⁴  that he would not tell a lie which is likely to be exposed.⁵  and consequently he would here also tell no lie;⁶  or is it possible that the reason why one witness is believed elsewhere⁷  is that [the woman] herself makes careful enquiries and [only then] marries again; here, therefore, [his evidence should not be accepted] since, as there was discord between husband and wife,⁸  she would not make careful enquiries and yet would marry again? — This remains undecided.⁹

R. JUDAH SAID: SHE IS NEVER etc. It was taught: They¹⁰  said to R. Judah: According to your statement, only a woman of sound senses¹¹  would be allowed to marry again while an imbecile¹²  would never be allowed to marry again! But the fact is that¹³  the one as well as the other may be allowed to marry again.

A woman¹⁴  once came to Rab¹⁵  Judah's Beth din. 'Mourn', they said to her, 'for your husband, rend your garments and loosen your hair'. Did they teach her to simulate!¹⁶  — They themselves held the same view as the Rabbis,¹⁷  but in order that he¹⁸  also should allow her to marry they advised her to do so.

MISHNAH. BETH HILLEL STATED: WE HAVE HEARD SUCH A TRADITION¹⁹  ONLY IN RESPECT OF A WOMAN WHO CAME FROM THE HARVEST²⁰  AND [WHOSE HUSBAND DIED] IN THE SAME COUNTRY,²¹  [THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEING THE SAME] AS THOSE OF A CASE THAT ONCE ACTUALLY HAPPENED. SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: [THE LAW IS] THE SAME WHETHER THE WOMAN CAME FROM THE HARVEST OR FROM THE OLIVE PICKING, OR FROM THE VINTAGE, OR FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER, FOR THE SAGES SPOKE OF THE HARVEST ONLY [BECAUSE THE INCIDENT TO WHICH THEY REFERRED] OCCURRED THEN.²²  BETH HILLEL, THEREFORE, CHANGED THEIR VIEW [THENCEFORWARD] TO RULE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPINION OF BETH SHAMMAI.

GEMARA. It was taught: Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel, According to your View,²³  one would only know the law concerning²⁴  the wheat harvest;²⁵  whence, however, [the law concerning] the barley harvest? And, furthermore, one would only know the law in the case where²⁴  one harvested; whence, however, [the law in the case where] one held a vintage, picked olives, harvested dates, or picked figs? But [you must admit] it is only the original incident that occurred at harvest time and that the same law is applicable to all [the other seasons]. So here also [we maintain that] the incident occurred with [a husband who died] in the same country. and the same law is applicable to all [other countries]. And Beth Hillel?²⁶  — In the case of the same country. where people freely [move about].²⁷  she is afraid;²⁸  [coming. however]. from one country to another, since people do not freely [move about].²⁹  she is not afraid.³⁰  And Beth Shammai?³¹  — Here³²  also caravans frequently [move about].³³

What was the original incident?³⁴ — [It was that of] which Rab Judah spoke in the name of Samuel: It was the end of the wheat harvest when ten men went to reap their wheat and a serpent bit one of them and he died [of the wound]. His wife, thereupon, came and reported the incident to Beth din, who, having sent [to investigate]. found her statement to be true. At that time it was ordained: If a woman stated, 'My husband is dead', she may marry again; [if she said] 'My husband is dead [and left no issue]', she may contract the levirate marriage.

Must it be suggested that R. Hanania b. Akabia³⁵  and the Rabbis differ on the same principle as that on which Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel differ? For it was taught: No man shall carry water of purification³⁶  and ashes of purification³⁶  across the Jordan on board a ship, nor may one stand on [the bank on] one side and throw them across to the other side, nor may one float them upon water nor may one carry them while riding³⁷  on a beast or on the back of another man unless his [own] feet were touching the [river] bed. He may, however, convey them across a bridge. [These laws are applicable] as well to the Jordan as to other rivers. R. Hanania b. Akabia³⁵  said: They³⁸  spoke³⁹  only of the Jordan and of [transport] on board a ship, as was the case in the original incident.⁴⁰  Must it, then, be assumed that the Rabbis⁴¹  hold the same view as Beth Shammai⁴²  while R. Hanania b. Akabia holds the same view as Beth Hillel?⁴³  — The Rabbis can answer you: Our ruling agrees with the view⁴⁴  of Beth Hillel also; for Beth Hillel maintained their opinion⁴⁵  only there,⁴⁶  since [the woman is believed only because] she fears [to tell an untruth, and it is only] in a place that is near that she fears while in a distant one she does not fear. Here,⁴⁷  however, what matters it whether it is on the Jordan or on other rivers!⁴⁸  R. Hanania b. Akabia can also answer you: I may uphold my view even according to Beth Shammai; for Beth Shammai maintained their opinion⁴⁹  only there⁴⁶  because [a woman] makes careful enquiries⁵⁰  and [only then] marries again. Hence, what matters it whether the locality was near or far. Here,⁵¹  however, [the prohibition] is due to an actual incident; hence it is only [against transport] on the Jordan and on board a ship, where the incident occurred, that the Rabbis enacted their preventive measure, but against other rivers where the incident did not occur the Rabbis enacted no preventive measure.

What was the incident?⁵²  — [It was that] which Rab Judah related in the name of Rab: A man was once transporting Water of purification⁵³  and ashes of purification⁵³  across the Jordan on board a ship, and a piece of a corpse, of the size of an olive,⁵⁴  was found stuck in the bottom of the ship. At that time It was ordained: No man shall carry Water of purification and ashes of purification across the Jordan on board a ship.

MISHNAH. BETH SHAMMAI RULED: SHE⁵⁵  IS PERMITTED TO MARRY AGAIN AND SHE RECEIVES HER KETHUBAH. BETH HILLEL, HOWEVER, RULED: SHE IS PERMITTED TO MARRY AGAIN BUT SHE DOES NOT RECEIVE HER KETHUBAH. SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: YOU HAVE PERMITTED [WHAT MIGHT BE] THE GRAVE OFFENCE OF ILLICIT INTERCOURSE,⁵⁶  SHALL WE NOT PERMIT [THE TAKING OF HER HUSBAND'S] MONEY WHICH IS OF LESS IMPORTANCE!⁵⁷  BETH HILLEL ANSWERED THEM: WE FIND

1. Lit., 'accustomed', i.e., introduced.
2. While the wife shewed no hatred towards him. As she does not hate him she would not invent a lie in order to get rid of him but would nevertheless readily believe that he was dead should he ever have found himself in a position of danger. She would not take the trouble to ascertain whether her conjecture was not groundless.
3. When he gives evidence that a husband died in normal circumstances.
4. And the widow is allowed to marry again.
5. V. supra p. 811, n. 13.
6. Hence he is believed.
7. V. supra note 3.
8. Lit., 'to him'.
9. Teku, v. Glos.
10. The Sages.,
11. Who feels her loss and gives expression to it by her weeping and her torn garments. Others render 'sly'. 'one able to simulate' (cf. Golds.).
12. Who is unconscious of her loss and consequently gives no outward expression to any grief. [H] may also be rendered 'foolish', 'silly', 'simpleton'. Cf. supra n. 11, second rendering.
13. Lit., 'but'.
14. Stating that her husband died in a country beyond the sea.
15. Cur. edd 'R'
16. Since she did not manifest any signs of grief her remarriage should, according to R. Judah's ruling. have been forbidden!
17. The Sages in our Mishnah and in the quoted Baraitha.
18. Rab Judah.
19. That a wife is believed when she states that her husband is dead,
20. The reason is explained infra.
21. It being thus possible to verify the woman's statement.
22. [H]. Lit., 'in what is', The ruling of the Sages was given in connection with a particular case where it so happened that the woman returned from a harvest. The same ruling, however, is applicable in all circumstances. [The term generally denotes 'what usually happens'. It is in this sense that it seems to be taken by the T. J. quoted by Tosaf. (s.v [H]]): Why should the harvest (be different)? Said A. Mana: It is different in that an accident usually happens there on account of the scorching sun].
23. That a wife's evidence regarding the death of her husband may be accepted only in circumstances similar to those of the original incident. (Cf. supra n. 4).
24. Lit., 'I have but'.
25. The incident (cf. supra note 4) having occurred during the wheat harvest.
26. Why do they draw a distinction between a husband's death in the same, and in another country.
27. From place to place. Another interpretation: Many people knew the husband.
28. To bring a false report which could be easily disproved by one of (a) the travellers or (b) the men who knew the husband, Cf. n. 2.
29. Cf. supra note 2 mutatis mutandis.
30. Cf'. supra n. 3 mutatis mutandis.
31. Do they not provide against the possibility of a wife's mendacity!
32. From one country to another.
33. Cf. supra note 2 and note 3 mutatis mutandis.
34. Spoken of supra.
35. So MS.M. Cur. edd., 'Akiba'.
36. Cf. Num. XIX, 1ff.
37. Lit., 'cause them to ride'.
38. The Sages.
39. When enacting the prohibitions mentioned.
40. Tosef. Parah VIII, v. supra.
41. The authors of the first ruling in the Baraitha cited.
42. Since both hold that the restrictions apply not only to conditions which are exactly the same as those of the original incident but to any other condition also.
43. Cf. supra n. 3 mutatis mutandis, Is it likely. however, that the Rabbis and R. Hanania would differ from Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai respectively!
44. Lit., 'we (as to) what we said'.
45. Restricting the law to conditions exactly similar to those of the original incident.
46. In the case of a wife's evidence on the death of her husband.
47. Transporting the water and ashes of purification.
48. Of course it does not matter.
49. Trusting the evidence of the wife in all cases, even where the conditions differ from those of the original incident.
50. Whether her husband was dead.
51. V. supra note 8.
52. Spoken of supra.
53. Cf Num. XIX, 1ff.
54. The minimum that causes defilement of objects that come in contact with it or that are placed in the same ohel (v. Glos.).
55. A woman who reports her husband's death.
56. If the woman were not telling the truth she would still be a married woman and her second marriage would be illicit,
57. Lit., 'that is light'.