Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Nazir

Folio 21a

The same principle¹  is taught in the following passage: If a man says, 'I intend to be a nazirite' and his companion overhear and delay long enough to make a break in conversation and then add, 'I too,' he himself is bound [by his vow], but his companion is free. The length of a break in conversation is the time taken by a disciple to greet his master.²

May we say that the following [passage] corroborates [Resh Lakish's statement]? [For the Mishnah says:] SHOULD A MAN SAY, I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE, AND HIS COMPANION OVERHEAR AND ADD 'I TOO,' [AND THE NEXT REPEAT] 'I TOO,' [ALL BECOME NAZIRITES];³  and carries the series no further?⁴  — Do you expect the Tanna to string together a list like a pedlar [crying his wares]?⁵  Then why should he not mention ['I too'] once only and leave us to infer the rest?⁶  — He could very well have done so, but because in the clause that follows he says: IF THE FIRST IS RELEASED [FROM HIS VOW] ALL ARE [AUTOMATICALLY] RELEASED, BUT IF THE LAST ONE IS RELEASED, HE ALONE BECOMES FREE, THE OTHERS REMAINING BOUND [BY THEIR VOWS], thus [using a phrasing which] implies that there is a person [or persons] in between, he mentions 'I too,' twice [in the opening clause].⁷

The question was propounded: Does each link up with his immediate predecessor, or do they all link up with [the utterance of] the first? The practical issue involved is whether the process can be continued indefinitely. If each links up with his immediate predecessor, then it would be possible to continue indefinitely,⁸  but if they all link up with the first one, the process could not continue for longer than the space of a break in conversation.⁹  What then is the law? — Come and hear: SHOULD A MAN SAY, I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE,' AND HIS COMPANION OVERHEAR AND ADD 'I TOO,' [AND THE NEXT REPEAT] 'I TOO'; without going further; and so we can infer that they all link up with the first,¹⁰  for if it be the case that each links up with his immediate predecessor, why should not the phrase 'I too' be repeated many more times? — Do you expect the Tanna to string together a list like a pedlar [crying his wares]? Then let him mention ['I too'] once, and indicate all the rest in this manner?¹¹  — Since he continues: IF THE FIRST IS RELEASED [FROM HIS VOW] ALL ARE [AUTOMATICALLY] RELEASED, BUT IF THE LAST ONE IS RELEASED, HE ALONE BECOMES FREE, THE OTHERS REMAINING BOUND [BY THEIR VOWS; thus using a phrasing] which implies that there are persons in between, he therefore mentions 'I too' twice [in the first clause].¹²

Come and hear: IF THE FIRST IS RELEASED [FROM HIS VOW] ALL ARE RELEASED; [it follows that] only [on the release of] the first are the others released, but not [on the release of] an intermediate one, and so we can infer that they all link up with the first one!¹³  — I can reply that actually each links up with his immediate predecessor, and the reason [why the first is mentioned] is that [the Tanna] desired to say that 'ALL ARE RELEASED', and if he had stated this in connection with the intermediate one there would have remained the first one unreleased; therefore he preferred to mention in this connection the first.¹⁴

Come and hear: IF THE LAST ONE IS RELEASED, HE ALONE BECOMES FREE, THE OTHERS REMAINING BOUND [BY THEIR VOWS]. [Now the reason for this is presumably because] there are no others following him,¹⁵  but if the second one, who is followed by others, [were released,] these would also become free,¹⁶  and so we can infer that each links up with his immediate predecessor! — In point of fact, I can argue that they all link up with the first, and that the expression 'THE LAST' [as used by the Tanna] refers to those in between [also], but because he speaks [in the preceding clause] of 'THE FIRST', he refers to the others as THE LAST.¹⁷

Come and hear [the following passage] where it is taught explicitly: If the first is released they all become free; if the last is released he alone becomes free, the rest remaining bound; if an intermediate one is released, those following him also become free, but those preceding him remain bound. This shows conclusively that each links up with his immediate predecessor.¹⁸

[IF HE SAYS,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE' AND HIS COMPANION OVERHEARS AND ADDS, 'LET MY MOUTH BE AS HIS MOUTH AND MY HAIR AS HIS HAIR,' [HE ALSO BECOMES A NAZIRITE]: Simply because he says, 'LET MY MOUTH BE AS HIS MOUTH AND MY HAIR AS HIS HAIR,' does he become a nazirite?¹⁹

1. According to the other commentators: To the same effect as Resh Lakish, as opposed to R. Judah.
2. Tosef. Naz. III, 1.
3. Which would show' that only two can attach themselves.
4. The argument is: If the Tanna merely desired to state that any number of persons can become nazirites by saying 'I too', he should not have stopped after two. Since he does stop, he must have had a different aim, viz to fix the length of the interval that can elapse and the formula still be valid. The interval is naturally that of a break in conversation.
5. Although the expression 'I too', is repeated only twice, there may be no limit to the number of persons who could become nazirites in this
6. Viz. That it is possible for any number to become nazirites by saying 'I too'.
7. To provide the extra person in between the first and the last.
8. Since any number of persons could become nazirites by each saying 'I too' within the specified interval after his immediate predecessor's declaration, 'I too'.
9. I.e., within the specified interval after the first person's declaration, 'I intend to be a nazirite.'
10. So that not more than two persons can say 'I too', consecutively and became nazirites.
11. I.e., since the Tanna does not wish to give a long list, why should he mention even as many as two persons. All the information is contained in the first statement that by saying 'I too' it is possible to become a nazirite.
12. Thus indicating the person in between the first and the last.
13. For otherwise all those who had spoken after any one of the intermediate ones should he released with that one.
14. But in point of fact if any one of the others is released, all the succeeding ones are released.
15. There are in existence several readings of the text at this point. We have adopted that of Tosaf., which keeps very close to the usual printed text.
16. The Mishnah is taken to mean: Only if it is the last one who is released, do all the others remain bound by their vows.
17. But his intention is to exclude only the first.
18. The Gemara frequently attempts to obtain a ruling from a Mishnah even though a Baraitha states explicitly what is required.
19. Which would seem to show that if he says, 'My mouth is a nazirite,' he is a nazirite.

[IF A WOMAN SAYS,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE, AND HER HUSBAND OVERHEARS AND ADDS, 'I TOO,' HE CANNOT DECLARE [HER VOW] VOID: The question was propounded: Does the husband nullify³  or does he only terminate [the vow]?⁴  The difference is of importance for deciding the case of a woman who vows to be a nazirite and whose companion overhears and says, 'I too,' and whose husband subsequently hears of the matter and declares her vow void. If it be decided that he nullifies [her vow], her companion is also set free,⁵  but if it be decided that he merely terminates [the vow], she herself will be released, and her companion will remain bound [to the vow]. What, then, is the law?

Come and hear: [IF A WOMAN SAYS,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE,' AND HER HUSBAND OVERHEARS AND ADDS, 'I TOO,' HE CANNOT DECLARE [HER VOW] VOID. Now, should you suppose that the husband terminates [the vow], he ought to be able to declare his wife's [vow] void, whilst remaining bound himself.⁶  It surely follows, therefore, [from the fact that he cannot do so] that a husband nullifies [his wife's vow]?⁷  — Not at all! Strictly speaking, the husband [in general] only terminates [the wife's vow,] and here by rights he should be able to declare her vow void,⁸  and the reason why he cannot do so is because his saying, 'I too,' is equivalent to saying, 'I confirm it for you,'⁹  and so if he [later] seeks to have the confirmation revoked,¹⁰  he can then declare [his wife's vow] void,¹¹  but not otherwise.

Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and sets aside the requisite animal [for the sacrifice] and her husband subsequently declares [the vow] void, then, if the animal was one of his own, it can be put to pasture with the herd,¹²  but if it was one of hers, the sin-offering is to be left to die [etc.].¹³  Now, should you suppose that the husband nullifies [the vow, the animal] should become profane?¹⁴  It surely follows, therefore, that the husband [merely] terminates [the vow]?¹⁵  — In point of fact, we can maintain that the husband nullifies [the vow], but [the animal remains sacred] for this reason. Since she no longer requires atonement,¹⁶  [the case] is similar to that of a sin-offering whose owner has died, and it is a tradition that sin-offerings whose owners have died are left to die.

Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and then drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she is to receive forty stripes.¹⁷  What exactly are the circumstances? If her husband has not declared [the vow] void, would it have been necessary to tell us this?¹⁸  Obviously, then, her husband must have declared [the vow] void.¹⁹  Now if you suppose that the husband nullifies [the vow], why should she receive forty stripes?²⁰  It surely follows, therefore, that the husband [only] terminates [the vow]?²¹  — In point of fact, we can maintain that the husband really nullifies [the vow], but [in this case] because we are told in the clause that follows: If her husband declares it void without her being aware of it, and she drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she does not receive the stripes;²²

1. But it is possible to live without hair or mouth-hence the conflict. Tosef. Naz. III, 1.
2. Thus expressly referring to the obligations of a nazirite. The statement is now very similar to the 'allusions' of Chapter I.
3. Lit., 'uproot'.
4. I.e., is it as though the vow had never been made, or is the vow only cancelled from the time it is declared void? V. Num, XXX, 7ff.
5. Since the words 'I too' have no object of reference.
6. She would be free hereafter, whilst he would remain a nazirite. Because the termination, while freeing her, in no wise affects the force of his 'I too'.
7. And so he cannot declare his wife's vow void, for by so doing, he would incidentally retract his own vow, which is forbidden.
8. Since the termination of her naziriteship does not affect his own naziriteship.
9. Once the husband has confirmed his wife's vow, he can no longer declare it void; v. Num. XXX, 16.
10. By applying to a Sage.
11. And he himself will remain a nazirite.
12. I.e., it ceases to be sacred and may be returned to the fold.
13. I.e., it is still sacred, v. infra 24a.
14. For the naziriteship is null, and the animal was set aside in error, v. infra 31a.
15. And the animal is actually a sin-offering, but cannot be offered since the woman is no longer a nazirite.
16. For she has ceased to be a nazirite; thus Rashi and the printed text, Tosaf. and other MSS. read: 'Since she requires atonement,' i.e., because she denied herself wine (v. supra 19a).
17. Infra 23a.
18. Viz., that she receives stripes. For she is no different from any other nazirite.
19. After his wife drank wine.
20. For we now see that she was not really a nazirite when she violated the rules of naziriteship.
21. And though she is no longer a nazirite, she must receive stripes for drinking wine when she was a nazirite,
22. Infra 23a.