Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 51a

'After all, however, [it may be objected] is not all that is ripe¹  for cutting²  regarded as already cut?'³  — 'I mean [dates] that are still dependent⁴  on the palm-tree'.⁵

A boy orphan and girl orphan⁶  once came before Raba.⁷  'Grant a bigger [maintenance allowance] to the boy', said Raba, 'for the sake of the girl'.⁸  Said the Rabbis to Raba: Did not the Master himself lay down [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of [a daughter's] maintenance, [a wife's] kethubah or [a daughter's] marriage outfit?⁹  — He answered them: Had he desired to have a handmaid to attend on him would we not have granted him [an Increased allowance for the purpose]?¹⁰  How much more then [should the allowance be increased] here¹¹  where it serves¹²  two [purposes].¹³

Our Rabbis taught: Both landed property¹⁴  and movable property may be seized¹⁵  for the maintenance of a wife¹⁶  or daughters;¹⁶  so Rabbi.¹⁷  R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled: Landed property may be seized for daughters¹⁸  from sons, for daughters from daughters,¹⁹  and for sons from Sons;¹⁹  for sons from daughters where the estate is large²⁰  but not where it is small.²¹  Movable property²²  may be seized for sons from sons,²³  for daughters from daughters²³  and for sons from daughters, but not for daughters from sons.²⁴  Although we have an established rule that the halachah is in agreement with Rabbi [where he differs] from his colleague, the halachah here is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Eleazar; for Raba stated: The law is [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of a kethubah, maintenance or marriage outfit.²⁵

MISHNAH. [IF A HUSBAND] DID NOT WRITE A KETHUBAH FOR HIS WIFE²⁶  SHE MAY RECOVER TWO HUNDRED ZUZ²⁷  [IF AT MARRIAGE SHE WAS] A VIRGIN, AND ONE MANEH²⁷  [IF SHE WAS THEN] A WIDOW, BECAUSE [THE STATUTORY KETHUBAH] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN.

IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ,²⁸  AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR,²⁶  'ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH',²⁹  HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT]³⁰  BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF HE DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR³¹  [THE CLAUSE], IF YOU ARE TAKEN CAPTIVE I WILL RANSOM YOU AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE,'²⁹  OR, IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE,³²  '²⁹  WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME',³³  HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [TO CARRY OUT THESE OBLIGATIONS], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN.

IF SHE IS TAKEN CAPTIVE IT IS HIS DUTY TO RANSOM HER; AND IF HE SAID, 'HERE³⁴  IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH LET HER RANSOM HERSELF', HE IS NOT ALLOWED [TO ACT ACCORDLNGLY].³⁵  IF SHE SUSTAINED AN INJURY IT IS HIS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR HER MEDICAL TREATMENT,³⁶  BUT IF HE SAID, HERE³⁴  IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH, LET HER HEAL HERSELF', HE IS ALLOWED [TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS DESIRE].

GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in our Mishnah]? It is [obviously that of] R. Meir who ruled [that the intercourse of] any man who undertakes to give a virgin less than two hundred zuz³⁷  or a widow less than 'a Maneh³⁷  is³⁸  an act of prostitution;³⁹  for if [it be suggested that it is the view of] R. Judah, he surely, [it can be objected] ruled, [that if a husband] wished he may write out for a virgin⁴⁰  a deed for two hundred zuz and she writes [a quittance]⁴¹  'I have received from you a maneh,' and for a widow [he may write out a deed for] a maneh and she writes [a quittance], 'I received from you fifty zuz'.⁴²  Read, however, the final clause: IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ, AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR, ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS⁴³  IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH' HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. Does not this obviously represent the view⁴⁴  of R. Judah who laid down that [the omission from a bond of the clause] pledging property⁴⁵  [is regarded as] the scribe's error?⁴⁶  for if [It be suggested that it represents the view of] R. Meir, he, surely, [it can be objected] ruled that [the omission of the clause] pledging property is not [regarded as] the scribe's error. For we have learned: If a man found notes of indebtedness

1. Lit., 'that stands'.
2. [H], so MS.M., Aruk, Tosaf. B.B. 42b (s.v. [H]). Cur. edd., [H] 'to shear', is also the reading of Tosaf. a.l. (s.v. [H]).
3. [H]. This is the reading of the authorities who adopt [H] (cf. supra n. 9). The others read [H].
4. Lit., 'require'.
5. Not being sufficiently ripe they are deemed to he part of the tree (cf. supra note 7).
6. Brother and sister whose deceased father's movable property had been entrusted to a guardian.
7. Claiming an allowance out of their father's estate.
8. Sc. an allowance that shall suffice for the two.
9. Infra 69b; how then did Raba allow the exaction of maintenance out of movable assets (v. supra n. 13)?
10. As heir the boy is entitled to have all his needs supplied from the estate.
11. Where the sister attends on her brother.
12. Lit., 'there is'.
13. Attendance and maintenance.
14. Lit., 'property which has surety', sc. to which a claimant may resort in case of non-payment by the defendant.
15. From orphans.
16. Of their deceased father.
17. Infra 68b.
18. For their maintenance or marriage outfit.
19. Sc. the younger are given equal shares with the elder though the latter had taken earlier possession of their father's estate.
20. V. next note.
21. I. e., if it does not suffice for the maintenance of the sons and the daughters until they reach adolescence (Rashi. Cf. B.B. 139b). In such a case the estate belongs to the daughters while the sons may go begging (B.B. loc. cit.).
22. Cf. supra n. 1 mutatis mutandis.
23. V. supra note 6.
24. Movable assets of the deceased in the possession of his sons are regarded, as far as his daughters are concerned, as non-existent.
25. Supra p. 292 and infra 69b.
26. Lit., 'for her'.
27. V. Glos.
28. The statutory amount of a virgin's kethubah.
29. This is one of the statutory clauses that a kethubah must contain.
30. V. p. 293. n. 15.
31. Lit., 'for her'.
32. With whom her husband (the priest) may not live again after she had been a captive and in whose favour the clause 'and take you again as wife' cannot be written.
33. Lit., 'country', 'district'.
34. Lit., 'behold'.
35. Since the obligation to ransom her is incurred as soon as she is taken captive.
36. Lit., 'to heal her'.
37. V. Glos.
38. Lit., 'behold this'.
39. Infra 54b.
40. As her kethubah.
41. Though she has received nothing.
42. Infra 54b. Now since our Mishnah insists on the payment of the full amount of the kethubah, presumably even if the woman had surrendered her claim (corresponding to a quittance), it can only represent the view of R. Meir who disallows such a surrender and not that of R. Judah who allows it.
43. This is assumed to include even property which he disposed of subsequent to the writing of the kethubah.
44. Lit., 'it comes'.
45. E.g that of the debtor to the creditor.
46. And not as the considered consent of the creditor. Despite its error the pledging clause is deemed to have been entered.

he must not restore them¹  if they contain a clause pledging property, because the court would exact payment from such property,²  but if they do not contain the clause pledging property, he must return them, because the court will not exact payment from the property;³  so R. Meir. The Sages,⁴  however, ruled: In either case he must not return them, because the court will exact payment from the property⁵  [in any case].⁶  Would then the first clause [represent the view of] R. Meir and the final clause that of R. Judah? And should you suggest that both clauses⁷  [represent the view of] R. Meir and that he draws a distinction between a kethubah and notes of indebtedness,⁸  [it could be retorted] does he, indeed, draw such a distinction? Has it not been taught: For five [classes of claims] may distraint be made only on free assets;⁹  they are as follows. [A claim for] produce,¹⁰  for amelioration shewing profits,¹¹  for an undertaking¹²  to maintain the wife's son or the wife's daughter, for a note of indebtedness wherein no lien on property had been entered, and for a woman's kethubah from which the clause pledging security was omitted.¹³  Now what authority have you heard laying down that [the omission from a deed of a record of] a lien on property is not regarded as the scribe's error?¹⁴  [Obviously it is] R. Meir;¹⁵  and yet it was stated, was it not, 'a woman's kethubah'?¹⁶  — If you wish, I might reply: [Our Mishnah represents the view of] R. Meir; and if you prefer I might reply: [It represents the View of] R. Judah. 'If you prefer I might reply: [It represents the view of] R. Judah', for there¹⁷  she specifically

IF HE DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR etc. Samuel's father ruled: The wife of an Israelite who had been outraged is forbidden to her husband, since it may be apprehended that the act begun²⁴  under compulsion may have terminated²⁵  with her consent.²⁶

Rab raised an objection against Samuel's father: [Have we not learned,] IF YOU ARE TAKEN CAPTIVE I WILL RANSOM YOU AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE?²⁷  The other remained silent. Rab thereupon applied to Samuel's father the Scriptural text, The princes refrained talking and laid their hand on their mouth.²⁸  What, however, could he have replied?²⁹  — [That the law]³⁰  was relaxed in the case of a captive.³¹

According to Samuel's father's ruling how is it possible to conceive a case of outrage which the All-Merciful deemed to be genuine?³²  — Where, for instance, witnesses testified that she cried from the commencement to the end.

[This ruling],³³  however, differs from that of Raba; for Raba laid down: Any woman, the outrage against whom began³⁴  under

It was taught in agreement with Raba: And she be not seized³⁷  [only then]³⁸  is she forbidden,³⁹  [from which it follows] that if she was seized⁴⁰  she is permitted.³⁹  But there is another class of woman who is permitted³⁹  even if she was not seized.⁴¹  And who is that? Any woman who began⁴²  under compulsion and ended⁴³  with her consent.

Another Baraitha taught: 'And she be not seized' [only then] is she forbidden⁴⁴  [from which it follows] that if she was seized⁴⁵  she is permitted.⁴⁴  But there is another class of woman who is forbidden⁴⁴  even though she was seized. And who is that? The wife of a priest.⁴⁶

Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel who had it from R. Ishmael: 'And she be not seized', [then only]⁴⁷  is she forbidden,⁴⁴  but if she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another class of woman who is permitted even if she was not seized. And who is that? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one,⁴⁸  and who may, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder, make a declaration of refusal⁴⁹  [against her husband] and go away.

Rab Judah ruled: Women who are kidnapped⁵⁰  are permitted to their husbands.⁵¹  'But', said the Rabbis to Rab Judah, 'do they⁵²  not bring bread to them?'⁵³  — [They do this] out of fear. 'Do they⁵²  not, however, hand them⁵³  their arrows?'⁵⁴  — [They do this also] out of fear. It is certain, however, that they⁵²  are forbidden if [the kidnappers] release then, and they go to them of their own free will.

Our Rabbis taught: Royal captives⁵⁵  have the status of ordinary captives⁵⁶  but those that are kidnapped by highwaymen are not regarded as ordinary captives. Was not, the reverse, however, taught? — There is no contradiction between the rulings concerning royal captives⁵⁷  since the former refers⁵⁸  [for example] to the kingdom of Ahasuerus⁵⁹  while the latter refers⁶⁰  to the kingdom of [one like] Ben Nezer.⁶¹  There is also no contradiction between the two rulings concerning captives of highwaymen⁶²  since the former refers⁶⁰  to [a highwayman like] Ben Nezer⁶¹  while the latter refers⁶⁰  to an ordinary highwayman.⁶³

As to Ben Nezer, could he be called there⁶⁴  'king' and here⁶⁵  'highwayman'? — Yes; in comparison with Ahasuerus he was a highwayman but in comparison with an ordinary robber he was a king.

OR, IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE, 'I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME' etc. Abaye ruled: If a widow was married to a High Priest⁶⁶  it is the latter's duty to ransom⁶⁷  her, since one may apply to her: OR IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE, I WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME',⁶⁸

1. Either to the creditor or to the debtor.
2. Lit., 'from them', sc. the nekasim (assets). Aliter: 'Exact payment on the strength of them', sc. the notes. Such exaction would be an injustice to the debtor if he has paid his liabilities and it was he who had lost the paid notes. But even where the creditor admits liability collusion with the object of robbing purchasers may be suspected (v. B.M. 12b).
3. Ff. supra n. 7, ab. init.
4. One of whom was R. Judah, a contemporary of R. Meir.
5. Ff. supra note 7.
6. Mishnah, B.M. 12b.
7. Lit., 'all of it'.
8. While in the case of the latter he does not regard the omission as a scribe's error, he does so in the case of the former since the terms of a kethubah are governed by statutory regulations laid down by Beth din.
9. Of the defendant; but not on his sold or mortgaged property.
10. In the case, for instance, where a field with its produce was taken away from a buyer by the man from whom the seller had robbed it. The buyer who may recover the cost of the field itself from the seller's sold or mortgaged property may not recover the cost of the produce except from his free assets. Cf. Git. 48b, B.M. 14b.
11. Where the buyer (cf. supra n. 3) incurred expense in effecting the improvements of the land.
12. Lit., 'and he who undertakes'.
13. B.K. 95a.
14. And that the holder of such a deed may only distrain on free assets.
15. Who most consequently be the author of the last cited Baraitha which states that 'a note of indebtedness wherein no lien on property had been entered' entitles the holder to distrain 'only on free assets'.
16. 'May be distrained only on free assets' if the clause pledging security was omitted from it. The section of our Mishnah, therefore, which states that, despite the omission of such a clause the husband is 'NEVERTHELESS LIABLE' and the kethubah may presumably be distrained on sold and mortgaged property also (v. supra p. 295. n. 2). cannot represent the view of R. Meir. How then could it be suggested that both clauses of our Mishnah (cf. supra p. 295, n. 12 and text) represent the view of R. Meir?
17. In the Mishnah (infra 54b) cited supra 51a, according to which the statutory sum of a kethubah may be reduced.
18. Lit., 'for him'.
19. And she has the right to renounce a portion of her claim.
20. In our Mishnah which allows the woman the full amount of her kethubah even if her husband had written none.
21. And the object of our Mishnah is to point out that a woman's consent to dispense with the written document of her kethubah is no evidence that she has surrendered her right to recover the statutory amount to which she is entitled. It is assumed rather that her indifference to the written document is due to her reliance on her statutory rights.
22. Lit., 'what … that was taught'.
23. His sold or mortgaged property, however, may not be distrained on, in agreement with R. Meir, since no lien on property had been recorded in the kethubah.
24. Lit., 'her beginning'.
25. Lit., 'and her end'.
26. And a wife who willingly played the harlot is forbidden to her husband.
27. Though a woman in captivity is usually assumed to have been outraged.
28. Job XXIX, 9.
29. Lit., 'what has he to say'.
30. Prohibiting an outraged woman to her husband.
31. Since her violation is only a suspicion.
32. Lit., 'permitted', sc. the woman is exempt from punishment. Cf. Deut. XXII, 26.
33. Samuel's father's.
34. Lit., 'her beginning'.
35. Lit., 'clothed'.
36. Being a victim of her passions she is deemed to have acted under compulsion even when she professed acquiescence.
37. Num. V, 13. E.V., neither she be taken in the act.
38. Sc. if she was not seized, i.e., if she did not act under compulsion but willingly.
39. To her husband.
40. Sc. if she acted under compulsion.
41. But acted willingly.
42. Lit., 'her beginning'.
43. Lit., 'and her end'.
44. To her husband.
45. Sc. if she acted under compulsion.
46. Yeb. 56b.
47. V. supra note 4.
48. When a condition which remained unfulfilled was attached to it. In such a case the woman may leave her husband without a letter of divorce and she has the status of a feme sole who had never before been married.
49. V. Glos. s.v. mi'un. [Isaiah Trani: This is not to be taken literally. It means simply that she is permitted to marry another man without a bill of divorce].
50. Lit., 'whom thieves steal'.
51. Any intercourse between the kidnappers and the women is regarded as outrage since the latter would not willingly consent to intimate relations with the men they detest.
52. The kidnapped women.
53. The thieves, which shows that they live on amicable terms with the kidnappers.
54. When their camp is attacked.
55. Sc. women forcibly taken into the royal harem (v. Rashi). Aliter. Captives of the government; 'forced by (Roman) officials' (Jast.).
56. And are permitted to their husbands, in agreement with the terms of the kethubah (cf. our Mishnah).
57. Lit., 'kingdom on kingdom'.
58. Lit., 'that'.
59. Sc. one taken captive by a royal personage. Not expecting ever to be married by such a person a captive would strenuously resist intimate relations.
60. Lit., 'that'.
61. [H] who was a robber and self-made ruler (cf. Rashi). A woman might well entertain the hope that such a man would consent to marry her and she might consequently allow intimate relations. Ben Nezer is identified by some authorities with Odenathos of Palmyra, who was first a robber chief and ultimately the founder of a dynasty (v. fast.). [V. Graetz, Geschichte, IV p. 453ff.].
62. Lit., 'robbery on robbery'.
63. With whom no decent woman would desire to be associated even in marriage. Intercourse with such a man must, therefore, he regarded as outrage.
64. In the second Baraitha cited.
65. The Baraitha first mentioned.
66. Though such a marriage is forbidden (cf. Lev. XXI, 14).
67. If she is taken captive.
68. The clause in her kethubah as the wife of a priest. Since her ransom would not lead to a re-union with the High Priest but only to her restoration to her parental home, he is obliged to ransom her.