CHAPTER IV

THE PRISONS OF SUCEAVA AND PITESTI

When the wholesale arrests of students began, the Moldavian region was oneof the hardest hit. Since the university in Iasi, Moldavia's capital, had for along time been a major center of all student movements of nationalisticcharacter, an extremely large number of students in the Faculties of Letters,Law, and Medicine of that university were immediately seized and confined. Theformer Suceava Fort outside the town was used as the place of temporaryimprisonment for these students, inasmuch as both the Securitate'sinvestigating offices and the trial chambers were within the fort, so theprisoners could be produced at a moment's notice by the penitentiary officials.Living conditions in the fort (later transformed into a disciplinary prison)were considered among the most severe of all the prisons of Romania, exceptingperhaps only Jilava. To the inhuman treatment and indescribable sanitaryconditions (the fort is permanently humid and without sunlight for most of theday) was added psychological terror produced by the presence of inquisitors whowere notorious for their sadism and their cruelty in torturing prisoners. Oneof these officers was the Commissar Pompilian, whom the Communists hadinherited from the old regime; another was a certain Fischer from somewhere inthe vicinity of Iasi, where he had been a small shopkeeper until he wastransformed into a police officer overnight.

Ostensibly for administrative reasons, but in reality to prepare for thecoming experiment, the Moldavian students were kept in this fort for quite sometime, even after their trials, and were only later transported to Pitesti.

Among them must be mentioned one, Turcanu, a student of law originally fromaround Radauti, who from the very first played the leading role in the tragedy.Turcanu had been a member of the Communist Party in Iasi; after his record hadbeen verified by the Soviet occupation of Romania, he was assigned to lead a"voluntary" team, part of an "international working brigade",on a railway construction project in Bulgaria. After completing thisprobationary work to the satisfaction of his masters, he was sent to a schoolof Communist diplomacy and destined for a diplomatic post abroad. Then,ostensibly, his brilliant prospects were shattered by a sudden arrest.

The reasons for his trial and subsequent imprisonment at Suceava areobscure. While a high school student, he knew that some of his classmates weremembers of an anti-Communist organization, with which, it was said, he hadsympathized or even associated himself.

Later at college he continued to maintain friendly relations with thoseformer classmates in high school who were now his fellow students in Iasi, andwere continuing clandestinely their fight against Communism. Whether Turcanucame to the university as a Communist or joined the apparatus there, hissuperiors must have known at the time that he was maintaining his acquaintancewith the unsuspecting anti-Communists, but that fact was "discovered"while the Communists were preparing him for a diplomatic career and providedthe legal pretext for a formal trial at which Turcanu was sentenced to sevenyears in correctional prison for "conspiracy. " The real reason forsending him to prison was a subtle one. He was considered by the Communists tobe sufficiently reliable to become their principal instrument in the initialphases of their experiment.

It is significant that both before the beginning of "politicalre-education" at Suceava as well as throughout the experiment, Turcanukept in direct and constant touch with individuals who were not members of theSecuritate's inquisitorial staff at the prisons. These individuals, who usuallycame from the Ministry of the Interior in Bucharest, must have been of superiorrank to those stationed in the prisons.

From his first days in the prison, Turcanu began to apply a plan previouslyformulated by the officers of the Securitate, who were themselves no more thaninstruments in the hands of their masters.

The initial phase of the plan consisted of a campaign of so-called"re-education" of the students -- a process calculated to"integrate" the students into the Communist society; in other words,forced political indoctrination.

From the beginning, Turcanu had as close collaborator the college studentTitus Leonida, also from the northern part of Moldavia, as well as anotheryouth, Bogdanovici, who had been still in high school.

The first step was the completion of statistical tables showing the originof those imprisoned at Suceava, their property, education, politicalaffiliations, and other items of personal information. The purpose of thesestatistics was to show that the great majority of students were merely victimsof the bourgeois reactionary education and that, considering their socialstatus, or "social class" as Communists say, their place was not inthe ranks of those opposing "Socialism" but, on the contrary,alongside the Communists. If for reasons of opportunism, some peasants wentalong at the beginning of this indoctrination, the great majority of theuniversity students reacted against the "re-education" propagandawith so firm a rejection that no doubt was left in the minds of the"teachers" that such methods were futile. Neither promises of liberationfrom prison as a reward for "re-education", nor promises that theywould be given holdings from the land that had been taken for distribution tothe peasants could shake the convictions of the prisoners. They knew therealities of Communist rule too well to degrade themselves by playing in such afarce.

To the lectures based on Communist pamphlets which political officers placedat the disposal of Turcanu and his accomplices, the students responded withridicule and mockery. The Communist songs in "meetings of politicalre-education" were turned into improvised parodies so clever anddevastating that after a time the political officers forbade Turcanu to allowsinging at all.

Practically speaking, the "re-education" period at Suceava endedin failure, and Turcanu's activity was suspended when the prisoners were atlast transferred from Suceava. That preliminary phase had been designed simplyto test the "fanaticism" of those who were thus selected for the realexperiment that was to begin at Pitesti.

Since they came from the same region, many of the students at Suceava hadbeen acquainted even before they entered the university and most of them knewone another, so contacts were easily kept. At Pitesti, however, they weremingled with hundreds of students from all the other universities of Romania.

The various groups thus assembled at Pitesti were of quite diverse socialbackgrounds and political principles. The great majority of them were eitherLegionaries,[1]or members of the National Peasant Party; a few were members of the LiberalParty, and there were several groups united only by their loyalty to themonarchy. There was also a goodly number of small groups, lacking a clearlystated political position -- the so-called "mushroom" organizations-- likened to the growth of mushrooms following a rain. The proliferation ofsuch groups was a consequence of the climate created by the Communist Partyitself. These groups also differed among themselves in the degree of theirdedication to the anti-Communist cause -- the criterion, incidentally, by whichthe "dangerousness" of the accused was judged, and the basis on whichthe Communist Securitate determined his punishment. Thus it was possible thatfor one and the same offense the sentence could be five, or twenty-five, years,depending upon the investigating officer's own estimate of the degree of thevictim's "fanaticism. "

The regimen of detention at Pitesti was very severe. In the world outsidethe prison nothing was known of what was taking place within the walls. TheCommunists brazenly called the Pitesti prison "The Center for StudentRe-education," a clever title which actually did tell the truth, butambiguously, the man in the street understanding one thing by"re-education," and those who were implementing it, another. Rumorswhose origin could not be traced, but which certainly emanated from theMinistry of the Interior, were designed to create the impression that the livesof students were not endangered; that on the contrary, truly humane conditionswere created for them; that in addition to decent food, they had at theirdisposal lecture halls, movies, courses of professional readjustment,entertainment, and other privileges. Since there were no other sources ofinformation, people somehow began to believe these rumors, particularly theparents of the prisoners who hoped against hope that they might soon see theirsons again; but this hope was illusory.

The prison at Pitesti was relatively new as compared to other prisons inRomania. Built by King Carol's regime, it was meant to shelter dangerous commoncriminals. Transformed into a political prison by Antonescu in 1941, itreverted to its original purpose after 1944. In 1947-48[2]it was used for the first time by Communists as an internment center for theNational-Peasant Congressmen arrested for their anti-Communist attitude inParliament. A little later it was called the "Center for StudentRe-education," under which name it was operated until 1951.

Situated to the northwest, outside the town limits, close to a small riverand far from any dwelling, it was a location almost ideal for torture, since noscream from within its walls could be heard by outsiders.

In this "Center," ideal for experimentation, were brought togetherall students arrested up to the fall of 1948. They were divided into fourcategories according to the classifications given when sentenced.

Category I consisted of students "retained" without even apretense of legality, on the simple basis of their political sympathies; forlack of proof of any offenses they could not be convicted of anything. This didnot prevent, however, their imprisonment for as much as six or seven years!

Category II consisted of those sentenced to "correctional" prisonterms for minor offenses: sheltering persons suspected of anti-Communist sentiments,or failure to denounce them; favoritism, membership in the Communist Partywithout activity on its behalf, or simply suspicion based on some reportedstatement! Most of these had no political orientation and were victims of theirown refractoriness, of special circumstances, or of the "subversive"organizations fabricated by the Ministry of the Interior to keep its spies andagents busy and to force the Communist cadres to be perpetually vigilant forsigns and dissatisfaction or "deviationism. " The sentences of thosein this category varied from three to five years of "correctional"imprisonment.

Category III consisted of individuals condemned, with some legaljustification, for offenses classified as "plotting against the socialorder. " These received sentences of from eight to fifteen years ofimprisonment under a severe regimen. The greatest number of students fell intothis category, which contained those whose activity was discovered but not inall cases confessed.

Those in category IV were sentenced to from ten to twenty-five years hardlabor. They were fewer than in category III. Here one found group leaders, menwho had been charged with special assignments, individuals of the student worldhaving an unusual influence over those around them, and members of groups thatwere thought to be prepared for armed resistance.

In theory, this was the classification according to the gravity of theoffense that is practiced in prisons all over the world. But in practice, thisclassification and segregation served to isolate the categories from oneanother, isolating the less "contaminated" from the "fanatics." Thus separated, the "minor" categories, deprived of theirformer leaders, were less able to resist the pressures to which they weresubjected. This was especially true in the second category, which contained alarge number of unstable individuals who were somehow predisposed to submitmore or less easily or, at worst, to offer less resistance.

Until the beginning of 1949, prisoners in the first three categories wereallowed to correspond with their families. once a month they were permitted towrite and receive a few censored lines and a food package of three to fivekilograms according to their category. Those in category IV were excluded from bothprivileges.

The food given prisoners was very poor. While a minimum of 1800 calories wasofficially specified by the administration, the food actually given tostudents, as to all other prisoners in Communist Romania, was normally limitedto 700-800 calories, although on very rare occasions as much as 1000 was given.Within a few weeks following arrest, the effects of this substandard diet,aggravated by punishments inflicted mercilessly, could be seen very clearly.All, especially the sick, became so physically weak that, when not coerced,they would commonly spend hours on end in almost total immobility to avoidusing energy. Thus, for those fortunate enough to receive them, packages offood from the outside were the most precious of gifts.

Medical assistance in the prison was practically nonexistent. It was limitedeither to dispensing an aspirin, irrespective of the ailment, or to strychnineshots for those whose nerves were shattered, a mere token treatment, andusually the number of injections was limited to from two to four.

During this preliminary period, the prisoners of the first three categories,who could receive monthly packages of food from their families, devised aningenious system to help the prisoners of the fourth category, who, sentencedto hard labor, were denied all communication with the outside. The latter wereincarcerated on the top floor of the building. Thus the prisoners below, byhaving a rope lowered from the windows above, could send up small quantities offood, especially to the sick and infirm. This was done, however, at great risk,for those caught were sent to "cazinca" -- a special room in theprison's cellar full of dirt, with walls permanently dripping with moisture.The prisoner was stripped down to a minimum of clothing and left without foodfor a period of time that depended on the whims of the warden or politicalofficer and which usually was in direct proportion to the degree of"fanaticism" of the prisoner. And as the "cazinca" neverlacked for prisoners, an increase in the number of tuberculosis cases was soonobserved.

It was under these conditions that the Ministry of the Interior, after thepreliminaries were judged adequate, decided to begin the real experiment. Foodpackages and correspondence with the outside were permanently discontinued. Theguards' terrorism increased in intensity. Torturings in the prison basementincreased in frequency, oftentimes for reasons patently trumped up. Threats,with mysterious meanings implied, frequent visits of the warden and politicalofficers to the cells, unexpected searches at all hours of day and night, andprohibition of every kind of activity under stiff penalty, were signs offast-approaching changes.


The group from Suceava, accompanied by Turcanu, had recently arrived atPitesti. Within the small circle of advocates of "re-education" atSuceava, a schism had occurred. Bogdanovici -- son of the prefect of IasiCounty who had threatened to disclaim him and deprive him of his name if herefused re-education -- continued to champion a system of re-education bypersuasion, limited to Communist ideological lectures and study of printedbrochures supplied by the prison administration. He later confessed, justbefore he was executed, that his aim was to limit brainwashing to theoreticaldiscussions and thus, by averting brutality, protect the students fromcompromising themselves; he hoped, he said, to deceive the organizers of theexperiment and to tergiversate in anticipation of possible liberation.

On the other hand Turcanu and Titus Leonida professed the necessity of asystem of "re-education by force", a system which by its very naturewas elastic and unrestricted, and which permitted any means for attaining itsobjective. It is, of course, understood that no decision concerning the meansto be employed could have been made without a formal order from the prison'sadministration. The proposal to use physical means was much more complicatedthan the Bogdanovici approach, for its purpose was not simply torture in orderto elicit true or even fictitious confessions from individuals; its avowedpurpose was to change the convictions of one thousand students hostile to theCommunist regime. Turcanu and his collaborators would not have dared even tothink of doing such a thing without knowing in advance that they had the totalsupport of the Securitate and thus of the Communist Party, and it is not likelythat they did more than pretend to advocate as their own a procedure they hadbeen instructed to use.

Just before he began to implement the "re-education by force,"Turcanu, we learned, had been visited several times by emissaries from theMinistry of the Interior, with whom he held private discussions for hours onend. [3]Also, he himself was absent from Pitesti for days, and no one knew whither hehad gone or for what purpose. What was the subject of his discussions and whatpromises he received could not be learned even by his closest collaborators.Once the tragedy began to unfold, his role appeared clearly and hideously. Hewas a simple agent carrying out an assigned mission.

The first act was the formation among the prisoners of an ostensiblyspontaneous and voluntary organization known as "the Organization ofDetainees of Communist Convictions. It was obvious that this organization wasofficially approved: its members claimed to be Party members, and their actionswere to be for the "benefit of the working class. " The organizationbeing thus established, the process of implementing the instructions given bythe Securitate was begun.


1)

I. e., The Legion of St. Michael the Archangel, which was undoubtedly the strongest, most resolute, and most devoted anti-Communist and nationalist organization in Romania. (Tr. )

2)

Until they deposed young King Michael (Mihai) on December 30, 1947, the Soviet maintained a pretense that their occupation of Romania was merely temporary, pending the conclusion of a treaty with Austria, and accordingly the full rigor of Bolshevik rule was not applied to Romania until 1948. (Tr. )

3)

[It may be well to remind the reader at this juncture that the primary function of the Ministry of Interior in Romania has always been exercise of the police power of the state, officially to maintain internal security, and also, under King Carol, to thwart and paralyze the political opposition. The nearest analogue in the United States is the office of the Attorney General (to which the F. B. I. is subject), and one can imagine the power of that department, if it had direct jurisdiction over all the state, county, and municipal police forces in the nation. When the Bolsheviks took over, they found ready for their own use a highly centralized government with a powerful police system, and they needed only to replace the Romanian officials with domestic traitors and imported alien terrorists. -- Editor]

4)

Hereafter referred to as O. D. C. C. (Tr. )