�It was 12 years ago, on March 14, 1983, that the commandant of

�the Marine Corps sent a highly unusual letter to the secretary of

�defense expressing frustration and anger at Israel. General R.H.

�Barrow charged that Israeli troops were deliberately threatening

�the lives of Marines serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. There

�was, he wrote, a systematic pattern of harassment by Israel

�Defense Forces (IDF) that was resulting in "life‑threatening

�situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their

�uniform and country."

�Barrow's letter added: "It is inconceivable to me why Americans

�serving in peacekeeping roles must be harassed, endangered

�by an ally...It is evident to me, and the opinion of the U.S.

�commanders afloat and ashore, that the incidents between the

�Marines and the IDF are timed, orchestrated, and executed for

�obtuse Israeli political purposes."1

�Israel's motives were less obtuse than the diplomatic general

�pretended. It was widely believed then, and now, that Israeli

�Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most

�Machiavellian politician‑generals, was creating the incidents

�deliberately in an effort to convince Washington that the two

�forces had to coordinate their actions in order to avoid such

�tensions. This, of course, would have been taken by the Arabs as

�proof that the Marines were not really in Lebanon as neutral

�peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis, a perception that

�would have obvious advantages for Israel.2

�Barrow's extraordinary letter was indicative of the frustrations

�and miseries the Marines suffered during their posting to

�Lebanon starting on Aug. 25, 1982, as a result of Israel's

�invasion 11 weeks earlier. Initially a U.S. unit of 800 men was

�sent to Beirut harbor as part of a multinational force to monitor

�the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. The Marines,

�President Reagan announced, "in no case... would stay longer

�than 30 days."3 This turned out to be only partly true. They did

�withdraw on Sept. 10, but a reinforced unit of 1,200 was rushed

�back 15 days later after the massacres at the Palestinian

�refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila that accompanied the

�Israeli seizure of West Beirut. The U.S. forces remained until

�Feb. 26, 1984.4

�During their‑year‑and‑a‑half posting in Lebanon, the Marines

�suffered 268 killed.5 The casualties started within a week of the

�return of the Marines in September 1982. On the 30th, a

�U.S.‑made cluster bomb left behind by the Israelis exploded,

�killing Corporal David Reagan and wounding three other

�Marines.6

�Corporal Reagan's death represented the dangers of the new

�mission of the Marines in Lebanon. While their first brief stay had

�been to separate Israeli forces from Palestinian fighters

�evacuating West Beirut, their new mission was as part of a

�multinational force sent to prevent Israeli troops from attacking

�the Palestinian civilians left defenseless there after the

�withdrawal of PLO forces. As President Reagan said: "For this

�multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw

�from Beirut."7

�"Incidents are timed, orchestrated, and

�executed for Israeli political purposes."

�Israel's siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982 had been

�brutal and bloody, reaching a peak of horror on Aug. 12, quickly

�known as Black Thursday. On that day, Sharon's forces launched

�at dawn a massive artillery barrage that lasted for 11 straight

�hours and was accompanied by saturation air bombardment.8

�As many as 500 persons, mainly Lebanese and Palestinian

�civilians, were killed.9

�On top of the bombardment came the massacres the next month

�at Sabra and Shatila, where Sharon's troops allowed Lebanese

�Maronite killers to enter the camps filled with defenseless

�civilians. The massacres sickened the international community

�and pressure from Western capitals finally forced Israel to

�withdraw from Beirut in late September. Troops from Britain,

�France, Italy and the United States were interposed between the

�Israeli army and Beirut, with U.S. Marines deployed in the most

�sensitive area south of Beirut at the International Airport, directly

�between Israeli troops and West Beirut.

�It was at the airport that the Marines would suffer their Calvary

�over the next year. Starting in January 1983, small Israeli units

�began probing the Marine lines. At first the effort appeared

�aimed at discovering the extent of Marine determination to resist

�penetration. The lines proved solid and the Marines'

�determination strong. Israeli troops were politely but firmly turned

�away. Soon the incidents escalated, with both sides pointing

�loaded weapons at each other but no firing taking place.

�Tensions were high enough by late January that a special

�meeting between U.S. and Israeli officers was held in Beirut to try

�to agree on precise boundaries beyond which the IDF would not

�penetrate.10

�No Stranger to the Marines

�However, on Feb. 2 a unit of three Israeli tanks, led by Israeli Lt.

�Col. Rafi Landsberg, tried to pass through Marine/Lebanese

�Army lines at Rayan University Library in south Lebanon. By this

�time, Landsberg was no stranger to the Marines. Since the

�beginning of January he had been leading small Israeli units in

�probes against the Marine lines, although such units would

�normally have a commander no higher than a sergeant or

�lieutenant. The suspicion grew that Sharon's troops were

�deliberately provoking the Marines and Landsberg was there to

�see that things did not get out of hand. The Israeli tactics were

�aimed more at forcing a joint U.S.‑Israeli strategy than merely

�probing lines.

�In the Feb. 2 incident, the checkpoint was commanded by Marine

�Capt. Charles Johnson, who firmly refused permission for

�Landsberg to advance. When two of the Israeli tanks ignored his

�warning to halt, Johnson leaped on Landsberg's tank with pistol

�drawn and demanded Landsberg and his tanks withdraw. They

�did.11

�Landsberg and the Israeli embassy in Washington tried to laugh

�off the incident, implying that Johnson was a trigger‑happy John

�Wayne type and that the media were exaggerating a routine

�event. Landsberg even went so far as to claim that he smelled

�alcohol on Johnson's breath and that drunkenness must have

�clouded his reason. Marines were infuriated because Johnson

�was well known as a teetotaler. Americans flocked to Johnson's

�side. He received hundreds of letters from school children,

�former Marines and from Commandant Barrow.12 It was a losing

�battle for the Israelis and Landsberg soon dropped from sight.

�But the incidents did not stop. These now included "helicopter

�harassment," by which U.S.‑made helicopters with glaring

�spotlights were flown by the Israelis over Marine positions at

�night, illuminating Marine outposts and exposing them to

�potential attack. As reports of these incidents piled up, Gen.

�Barrow received a letter on March 12 from a U.S. Army major

�stationed in Lebanon with the United Nations Truce Supervisory

�Organization (UNTSO). The letter described a systematic pattern

�of Israeli attacks and provocations against UNTSO troops,

�including instances in which U.S. officers were singled out for

�"near‑miss" shootings, abuse and detention.13 That same day

�two Marine patrols were challenged and cursed by Israeli

�soldiers.14

�Two days later Barrow wrote his letter to Secretary of Defense

�Caspar W. Weinberger, who endorsed it and sent it along to the

�State Department. High‑level meetings were arranged and the

�incidents abated, perhaps largely because by this time Ariel

�Sharon had been fired as defense minister. He had been found

�by an Israeli commission to have had "personal responsibility"

�for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.15

�Despite the bad taste left from the clashes with the Israelis, in

�fact no Marines had been killed in the incidents and their lines

�had been secure up to the end of winter in 1983. Then Islamic

�guerrillas, backed by Iran, became active. On the night of April

�17, 1983, an unknown sniper fired a shot that went through the

�trousers of a Marine sentry but did not harm him. For the first

�time, the Marines returned fire.16

�The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up by a

�massive bomb, with the loss of 63 lives. Among the 17

�Americans killed were CIA Mideast specialists, including Robert

�C. Ames, the agency's top Middle East expert.17 Disaffected

�former Israeli Mossad case officer Victor Ostrovsky later claimed

�that Israel had advance information about the bombing plan but

�had decided not to inform the United States, a claim denied by

�Israel.18 The Iranian‑backed Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

�Veteran correspondent John Cooley considered the attack "the

�day [Iranian leader Ayatollah] Khomeini's offensive against

�America in Lebanon began in earnest." 19

�Still, it was not until four months later, on Aug. 28, that Marines

�came under direct fire by rocket‑propelled grenades and

�automatic weapons at International Airport. They returned fire

�with M‑16 rifles and M‑60 machine guns. The firefight resumed

�the next day with Marines firing 155mm artillery, 81mm mortars

�and rockets from Cobra helicopter gunships against Shi'i Muslim

�positions. Two Marines were killed and 14 wounded in the

�exchange, the first casualties in actual combat since the Marines

�had landed the previous year.20

�From this time on, the combat involvement of the Marines grew.

�Their actions were generally seen as siding with Israel against

�Muslims, slowly changing the status of the Marines as neutral

�peacekeepers to opponents of the Muslims.21 Israel could hardly

�have wished for more. The polarization meant that increasingly

�the conflict was being perceived in terms of the U.S., Israel and

�Lebanon's Christians against Iran, Islam and Lebanon's Shi'i

�Muslims.

�Accelerating the Conflict

�Israel accelerated the building conflict on Sept. 3, 1993 by

�unilaterally withdrawing its troops southward, leaving the Marines

�exposed behind their thin lines at the airport. The United States

�had asked the Israeli government to delay its withdrawal until the

�Marines could be replaced by units of the Lebanese army, but

�Israel refused.22 The result was as feared. Heavy fighting

�immediately broke out between the Christian Lebanese Forces

�and the pro‑Syrian Druze units, both seeking to occupy positions

�evacuated by Israel, while the Marines were left in the crossfire.

�23On Sept. 5, two Marines were killed and three wounded as

�fighting escalated between Christian and Muslim militias.24

�In an ill‑considered effort to subdue the combat, the Sixth Fleet

�frigate Bowen fired several five‑inch naval guns, hitting Druze

�artillery positions in the Chouf Mountains that were firing into the

�Marine compound at Beirut airport.25 It was the first time U.S.

�ships had fired into Lebanon, dramatically raising the level of

�combat. But the Marines' exposed location on the flat terrain of

�the airport left them in an impossible position. On Sept. 12, three

�more Marines were wounded. 26

�On Sept. 13, President Reagan authorized what was called

�aggressive self‑defense for the Marines, including air and naval

�strikes.27 Five days later the United States essentially joined the

�war against the Muslims when four U.S. warships unleashed the

�heaviest naval bombardment since Vietnam into Syrian and

�Druze positions in eastern Lebanon in support of the Lebanese

�Christians.28 The bombardment lasted for three days and was

�personally ordered by National Security Council director Robert

�McFarlane, a Marine Corps officer detailed to the White House

�who was in Lebanon at the time and was also a strong supporter

�of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite Christian allies. McFarlane

�issued the order despite the fact that the Marine commander at

�the airport, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, strenuously argued

�against it because, in the words of correspondent Thomas L.

�Friedman, "he knew that it would make his soldiers party to what

�was now clearly an intra‑Lebanese fight, and that the Lebanese

�Muslims would not retaliate against the Navy's ships at sea but

�against the Marines on shore." 29

�By now, the Marines were under daily attack and Muslims were

�charging they were no longer neutral.30 At the same time the

�battleship USS New Jersey, with 16‑inch guns, arrived off

�Lebanon, increasing the number of U.S. warships offshore to 14.

�Similarly, the Marine contingent at Beirut airport was increased

�from 1,200 to 1,600.31

�A Tragic Climax

�The fight now was truly joined between the Shi'i Muslims and the

�Marines, who were essentially pinned down in their airport

�bunkers and under orders not to take offensive actions. The

�tragic climax of their predicament came on Oct. 23, when a

�Muslim guerrilla drove a truck past guards at the Marine airport

�compound and detonated an explosive with the force of 12,000

�pounds of dynamite under a building housing Marines and other

�U.S. personnel. Almost simultaneously, a car‑bomb exploded at

�the French compound in Beirut. Casualties were 241 Americans

�and 58 French troops killed. The bombings were the work of

�Hezbollah, made up of Shi'i Muslim guerrillas supported by

�Iran.32

�America's agony increased on Dec. 3, when two carrier planes

�were downed by Syrian missiles during heavy U.S. air raids on

�eastern Lebanon.33On the same day, eight Marines were killed

�in fighting with Muslim militiamen around the Beirut airport.34

�By the start of 1984, an all‑out Shi'i Muslim campaign to rid

�Lebanon of all Americans was underway. The highly respected

�president of the American University of Beirut, Dr. Malcolm Kerr,

�a distinguished scholar of the Arab world, was gunned down on

�Jan. 18 outside his office by Islamic militants aligned with Iran.35

�On Feb. 5, Reagan made one of his stand‑tall speeches by

�saying that "the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and

�dangerous. But this is no reason to turn our backs on friends and

�to cut and run."36

�The next day Professor Frank Regier, a U.S. citizen teaching at

�AUB, was kidnapped by Muslim radicals.37 Regier's kidnapping

�was the beginning of a series of kidnappings of Americans in

�Beirut that would hound the Reagan and later the Bush

�administrations for years and lead to the eventual expulsion of

�nearly all Americans from Lebanon where they had prospered for

�more than a century. Even today Americans still are prohibited

�from traveling to Lebanon.

�The day after Regier's kidnapping, on Feb. 7, 1984, Reagan

�suddenly reversed himself and announced that all U.S. Marines

�would shortly be "redeployed." The next day the battleship USS

�New Jersey fired 290 rounds of one‑ton shells from its 16‑inch

�guns into Lebanon as a final act of U.S. frustration.38 Reagan's

�"redeployment" was completed by Feb. 26, when the last of the

�Marines retreated from Lebanon.

�The mission of the Marines had been a humiliating failure�not

�because they failed in their duty but because the political

�backbone in Washington was lacking. The Marines had arrived

�in 1982 with all sides welcoming them. They left in 1984

�despised by many and the object of attacks by Muslims. Even

�relations with Israel were strained, if not in Washington where a

�sympathetic Congress granted increased aid to the Jewish state

�to compensate it for the costs of its bungled invasion, then

�between the Marines and Israeli troops who had confronted each

�other in a realpolitik battlefield that was beyond their competence

�or understanding. The Marine experience in Lebanon did not

�contribute toward a favorable impression of Israel among many

�Americans, especially since the Marines would not have been in

�Lebanon except for Israel's unprovoked invasion.

�This negative result is perhaps one reason a number of Israelis

�and their supporters today oppose sending U.S. peacekeepers

�to the Golan Heights as part of a possible Israeli‑Syrian peace

�treaty. A repeat of the 1982‑84 experience would certainly not be

�in Israel's interests at a time when its supporters are seeking to

�have a budget‑conscious Congress continue unprecedented

�amounts of aid to Israel.

�RECOMMENDED READING:

�Ball, George, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, Washington, DC,

�Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984.

�*Cockburn, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison:

�The Inside Story of the U.S.‑Israeli Covert Relationship, New

�York, Harper Collins, 1991.

�Cooley, John K., Payback: America's Long War in the Middle

�East , New York, Brassey's U.S., Inc., 1991.

�*Findley, Paul, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts About

�the U.S.‑Israeli Relationship, Brooklyn, NY, Lawrence Hill

�Books, 1993.

�Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, New

�York, Atheneum, 1990.

�Frank, Benis M., U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, History

�and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

�Washington, DC, 1987.

�*Friedman, Thomas L., From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York,

�Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1989.

�*Green, Stephen, Living by the Sword, Amana, 1988.

�*Jansen, Michael, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded

�Lebanon , London, Zed Press, 1982.

�MacBride, Sean, Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the

�International Commission to enquire into reported violations of

�international law by Israel during its invasion of Lebanon ,

�London, Ithaca Press, 1983.

�Ostrovsky, Victor and Claire Hoy, By Way of Deception, New

�York, St. Martin's Press, 1990.

�Peck, Juliana S., The Reagan Administration and the

�Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days , Washington,

�DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.

�*Randal, Jonathan, Going all the Way, New York, The Viking

�Press, 1983.

�Schechla, Joseph, The Iron Fist: Israel's Occupation of South

�Lebanon, 1982‑1985 , Washington, D.C.: ADC Research

�Institute, Issue Paper No. 17, 1985.

�*Schiff, Ze'ev and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, New York,

�Simon and Schuster, 1984.

�Timerman, Jacobo, The Longest War: Israel in Lebanon, New

�York, Vantage Books, 1982.

�Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981‑1987,

�New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.

�* Available through the AET Book Club.

�NOTES:

�1 New York Times, 3/18/83. For a detailed review of these

�clashes, see Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 177‑92, and Clyde

�Mark, "The Multinational Force in Lebanon," Congressional

�Research Service, 5/19/83.

�2 See "NBC Nightly News," 6:30 PM EST, 3/17/86; also, George

�C. Wilson, Washington Post, 2/5/83.

�3 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, p. 51; Cooley, Payback,

�pp. 69‑71.

�4 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 137.

�5 Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984 , Appendix F.

�6 New York Times, 10/1/82. Also see Cooley, Payback, p. 71;

�Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 175‑77

�7 The text is in New York Times, 9/30/82. Also see Peck, The

�Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, p. 76.

�8 Schiff & Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 225.

�9 "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," Journal of

�Palestine Studies, Summer/Fall 1982,

�p. 189.

�10 Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 178‑80.

�11 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, pp. 45‑46.

�12 Ibid.

�13 Green, Living by the Sword, p. 182.

�14 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 56.

�15 New York Times, 2/9/83; "Final Report of the Israeli

�Commission of Inquiry," Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring

�1983, pp. 89‑116.

�16 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982‑1984, p. 56.

�17 New York Times, 4/22/83 and 4/26/83. For more detail on

�CIA victims, see Charles R Babcock, Washington Post, 8/5/86,

�and Woodward, Veil, pp. 244‑45.

�18 Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, p. 321.

�19 Cooley, Payback, p. 76.

�20 New York Times, 8/30/83.

�21 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, pp. 75‑77.

�22 New York Times, 9/5/83.

�23 Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 489‑91; Friedman, From Beirut to

�Jerusalem, p. 179.

�24 New York Times, 9/6/83.

�25 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 505.

�26 New York Times, 9/14/83.

�27 New York Times , 9/13/83.

�28 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83.

�Also see Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, p. 335; Fisk, Pity the

�Nation, p. 505; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem , p. 210.

�29 Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 200‑01. Also see

�Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 190‑92.

�30 New York Times, 9/29/83.

�31 New York Times, 9/25/83; David Koff, "Chronology of the War

�in Lebanon, Sept.‑November, 1983," Journal of Palestine

�Studies, Winter 1984, pp. 133‑35.

�32 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83.

�Also see Cooley, Payback, pp. 80‑91; Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp.

�511‑22; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 201‑4;

�Woodward, Veil, pp. 285‑87.

�33 New York Times , 1/4/84; Cooley, Payback, pp. 95‑97.

�34 New York Times, 12/4/83.

�35 New York Times, 1/19/84. Also see New York Times,

�1/29/84, and Cooley, Payback, p. 75. For a chronology of

�attacks against Americans in this period, see the Atlanta

�Journal, 1/31/85.

�36 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533.

�37 New York Times, 4/16/84. Also see Cooley, Payback , p.

�111; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 565.

�38 Cooley, Payback, p. 102; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533;

�Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 220